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Abstract 
 
This essay explores two approaches to finding existential meaning in religion: either by an 
approach advocating feelings of mystery and sensuous immediacy, thus justifying an ineffability 
of mysterious experiences, or by an approach which advocates truth and objectivity. Although 
the latter approach views truth in existential terms (“existential truth”) it can be criticised for 
diminishing the “magic” of religion much in the same way science does in its pursuit of material 
truth. In order to find answers as to whether this is the case and as to whether we can justify 
“effability” in theory, religion is compared to art: the two approaches are applied to the field of 
art in a continuous dialogue with the religious field. By discussing not only the ideas of 
philosophers like Eberhard Herrmann, Hilary Putnam, Peder Thalén and Arthur Schopenhauer, 
but also by contemplating the output of artists like Shakespeare, Hjalmar Söderberg and David 
Lynch, the so-called Truth approach is found to have the ability to more accurately (than the 
Mystery approach) connect artistic and religious expressions to our emotions. The possibility of 
recreating a sensuous experience of those expressions is also considered. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview and question at issue 
 
In the beginning of the 20th century, William James proclaimed that one of the qualities of 
mystical religious experiences is their ineffability.1 This attitude, that an experience defies 
conceptual expression, is found not only in religion, but also in art: rather than analysing the 
contents of an artwork, we should be quiet, both because words are not adequate to express the 
experience and because words diminish the “magic” created by the mystery of said artwork. The 
opposing standpoint would be to demand truth (or “describability”) from religion and art and 
state that it is not only possible to express in words the mystery of religion and art, but also an 
existentially rewarding practice which is why we should express it in words. It is, namely, with 
regards to existential meaning that I will examine these two approaches – henceforth called the 
Mystery approach and the Truth approach – towards art and religion with the intent of 
examining the justification of either approach in the appreciation of religion. (Art will be used as 
support in clarifying the relationship of truth and mystery in religion, hence not all arguments will 
stem from discussions on art.)  
I will assume that the search for religious truth and the appreciation of religious 
mystery are two distinct (and perhaps in part incompatible) approaches to religion, but that they 
are both ways of creating existential meaning in religion. While both approaches will be 
considered, this essay is by and large an attempt at a defence of truth over mystery, and while 
many things have certainly been written about feelings of mystery in art and religion in practice, I 
will consider how we may justify a conceptualising approach in theory. The central question of 
this essay is therefore: 
 
Should religion be appreciated as Truth with regards to existential meaning in spite of the possible 
loss of religion as Mystery? 
 
In order to determine the existential power of each, a comparison between interpretative 
approaches of art will be made for the reason that, assumedly, both art and religion provide 
human beings with existential meaning and consequently that art and religion can be compared 
with regards to how we create meaning in the appreciation of each. This will come about by 
exploring to which degree art creates meaning for us depending on different approaches of 
                                                 
1 W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion 
delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 301f. 
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creating it: the Mystery approach and Truth approach are applied to the field of the arts and the 
results of this investigation are then re-applied to the religious field. Hence when one asks, “To 
which degree does an artwork create existential meaning when we use approach x?” one is given 
an answer concerning to which degree religion creates existential meaning when we use x. 
 
1.2 Intent 
 
The general motivation behind this study is to clarify the relationship between experience and 
concepts in religion with regards to the meaning of life. I wonder how “untouchable” and fragile 
the feelings of mystery in religion (and art for that matter) really are, and hope that we can, after 
all, treat these feelings with words and concepts in a way that creates existential meaning rather 
than destroys it. 
An additional motivation is the hope that its method – the comparison of art and 
religion – will prove a way to discuss and describe the function of religion in secular discourse, at 
least from an existential point of view. Religion is one approach to the existential issues which all 
human beings – including those of a secular upbringing – are forced to handle, and yet religion is 
a difficult subject to fathom – especially so, perhaps, by those same individuals who have had no 
close contact with religious life. In order to find common ground for both the secular and the 
religious, art seems a reasonable compromise because it straddles the existential field of religion 
and yet is something which a secular world may more readily find relatable: although the average 
atheist may be suspicious towards religion, he or she usually finds pleasure and meaning in books, 
paintings, films and music. (Indeed, Vilhelm Ekelund wrote that the source of all art is mankind‟s 
inability to live without gods.2) With such a comparison as tool secular societies may be more 
easily able to “evaluate” religion by how it may bring meaning to people‟s lives. As a consequence 
for this essay, the discussions on art are used both to provide support for ideas on religion, but 
also to show how meaning can be found in religion as well as art. 
A practical reason for using art as support in clarifying the relationship of truth and 
mystery in religion, is that I believe the art community has come to develop a body of art critics 
whose whole raison d’être is to offer critique for how well an individual work in their field stands 
up to human emotional needs. It could serve religion well to have it scrutinized as though it were 
an artwork. 
 
                                                 
2 V. Ekelund, Nordiskt och klassiskt, Stockholm, Albert Bonniers förlag, 1914, p. 30. 
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1.3 A closer look at the issue: the conflict between truth and 
mystery 
 
Consider the smiling face of a 6-month-old toddler. You smile back. It is nearly impossible not to 
do so and you feel as though the rest of the world disappears: time and space have vanished from 
your conscious mind and you feel like this is exactly where you have always wanted to be. Losing 
yourself in the moment like this does not ask for what the meaning of life is: it is self-evident; no 
questions are asked and no answers are needed. The smile of a toddler, we then say, is a mystery. 
A mystery is ineffable, difficult to put into words, but during that moment of bliss our intellect‟s 
use of language seems irrelevant. This is what will be labelled the Mystery approach, adopted by 
people who believe that ultimate meaning is found in the immediate (though not necessarily 
short-term) and sensual experiences in religious life, not intellectual reflection. From a Mystery 
approach point of view, the nature of God is immediately known (if ever), not through 
knowledge or thought per se. Thought is, namely, only one human approach to the world.3 
According to Muhammad Iqbal, a mystical experience is impossible to analyse because it “brings 
us into contact with the total passage of Reality”, a single unity of stimuli as opposed to the world 
as divided and conceptualised by us into the distinction of subject and object.4 In art, as well, we 
may choose to appreciate an artwork as an immediate unity of sensuous experience. 
This is contrasted to a need to question life and demand answers from it. This 
approach is not about losing oneself in the gaze of a toddler, but to actively “figure things out”. 
In the arts, we may thus appreciate an artwork as an analysed, divided, conceptualised set of 
objects which may point to a unifying theme rather than being a unification of subject and object, 
i.e. losing one‟s self in the artwork. In the field of the natural sciences this attitude is evident in its 
demand for truth, a demand for discrimination between what is true and what is false in the 
physical world outside of human emotions. It may be argued that because science, as it is often 
perceived, only deals with the “material world” it is therefore not applicable to religious matters 
which deal with the human soul.5 As will be discussed further on, however, the same incentive to 
find truth which we commonly see in the work of e.g. natural scientists is as relevant to the 
existential search for meaning in life. Hence this essay will not be concerned with the debate on 
whether God exists from a materialist, scientific point of view, i.e. the ontological debate 
concerning what is out there. Rather, this essay wholly appertains to the human existential 
                                                 
3 M. Henry, I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 26-8. 
4 M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Palo Alto, Stanford University Press, pp. 14f. 
5 This distinction between matter and spirit is made for practical reasons; „spirit‟ or „soul‟ will concern human 
emotions and subjective experience as opposed to the objects around us with which we interact, irrespective of 
whether „soul‟ and „matter‟ strictly speaking are of a single substance or constitute dual realities. 
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venture for meaning; the “scientific” approach in this context regards the way in which truth as 
opposed to mystery influences our existential satisfaction in religious life. The truth-seeking 
scientist of the soul is then someone who tries to explain and put religious experience into words 
– i.e.to conceptualise religion – in the hope that this approach will make religious experience 
more meaningful. 
But this is where the conflict between truth and mystery occurs. When investigating 
religion scientifically the question arises whether or not (and in what way) such an investigation is 
at all justified, and most importantly whether or not we run the risk of in any way “damaging” the 
subject in question because of our investigation. It might be argued that there is a danger – 
whether slight or significant – that the “magic” of religious people‟s faith is diminished by 
scientific methods.6 But even if we deal with truth in an existential manner – seeking truths of the 
soul as opposed to ones that demand material evidence – there is a risk that the Truth approach 
to religion will deteriorate the power of the existential meaning created by religion as long as we 
use words to express it. The intention of the Truth approach – to question the experience of the 
smiling toddler, to ask what it means (or even having in mind what it may mean) and try to put it 
into words – may disturb one‟s appreciation of the experience: the method of the Truth approach 
may distract from its meaningfulness. Thus is not the act of trying to understand religion as 
though there is a definite objective truth which should be uncovered a way of “missing the point” 
or outright ruining religious experience? Should not merely experiencing faith and enjoying it “as 
is”, as it comes to us be more than enough to justify one‟s belief? And, more significantly, is not 
immediacy of faith also the most important aspect of the existential enjoyment of religious life? 
Does not analysis of one‟s own faith “from outside” take focus from the experience of faith? 
Does not intellectual analysis question faith‟s existential authenticity and introduce an element of 
doubt to religious belief, whichever belief that may be? These questions may be contrasted with 
the ideas of scientists like Richard Dawkins: to try to obtain truth does not constitute an 
existential problem because there is more to enjoy in the world than what mysticism provides: 
 
The mystic is content to bask in the wonder and revel in a mystery that we are not 
„meant‟ to understand. The scientist feels the same wonder but is restless, not 
content; recognizes the mystery as profound, then adds, „But we‟re working on it.‟7 
 
The dissimilarity between truth and mystery may be further exemplified by the difference in 
attitude between 17th century philosophers René Descartes and Blaise Pascal. Descartes willingly 
                                                 
6 D. C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell, New York, Penguin Putnam Inc., 2007, pp. 15, 154. 
7 R. Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and Appetite for Wonder, London, Penguin Books Ltd., 1999, p. 17. 
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alienated the human mind from the spatial world in order to seek scientific truths, viewing God 
as a wholly instrumental tool of philosophers, while Pascal found this instrumentality a 
devastating blow to religious authenticity. Faith, he proclaimed, is about emotions, not reason.8 
Even the biblical story of the fall of man in Genesis could be interpreted to 
highlight this conflict. Adam and Eve live a life of ignorant bliss in the Garden of Eden, an 
innocence that is then ruined by knowledge by uncovering that which should not be uncovered, 
thus stifling meaning. From this point of view, the issue of truth versus mystery boils down to 
the question whether or not we can make the events in life meaningful by having them “pinned 
down” and return to them repeatedly (experience/truth), or if we need to feel everything as 
though experienced for the first time, like a new-born in every situation (innocence/mystery). 
The experience/innocence dichotomy may then be re-interpreted as our relationship to divinity. 
Don Cupitt writes that we both want to come closer to the Gods and keep them distant.9 If we 
get too close, there is no mystery; if we keep too far a distance, we lose contact with our soul 
altogether. 
 What will be called the Truth approach of religion is thus the pursuit of truth in 
religion through interpretation and conceptualisation, to pinpoint an “aboutness” of religion to 
reach a better understanding of it. It is the “describability” of religion. What will be called the 
Mystery approach of religion is the immediacy and ineffable mystery of religious experience. The 
Mystery approach in this essay does not refer to a method supposed to seek out any sort of 
knowledge or truth, but rather to preserve the mystery of religious feelings undisclosed. 
 
2. What is meaning? 
 
In order to decide whether a certain approach towards art and religion is better able to provide 
the receiver with existential meaning, we must define what „existential meaning‟ entails. This essay 
assumes an anthropocentric and individualistic approach to the meaning of life. What will be 
discussed is not the meaning of all life, the meaning of life of humanity at large or even the 
meaning of life of a small group of people, but rather answers to the single human being‟s 
question: “What is the meaning of my life?”10 Therefore, when the potential of existential meaning 
inherent in artworks and religious life is discussed, it is a discussion of in what way these artworks 
and religious aspects provide a single individual with existential meaning. 
 
                                                 
8 D. Cupitt, Sea of Faith, London, SCM Press, 2010, pp. 54f, 58. 
9 Ibid, pp. 120-3. 
10 M. Furberg, Allting en trasa? En bok om livets mening, Nora, Nya Doxa, 1987, p. 11. 
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2.1 A note on art and religion as “providers” of meaning 
 
The existential alternatives available to the individual are diverse. First of all, there are many 
different kinds of experiences with their origin in many different kinds of objects, artefacts, 
events and phenomena that are able to provide an individual with increased feelings of meaning 
in his or her life. Second, there is no one exclusive object common to all human beings which 
must be realised in order for life to have meaning, because we simply are not enough alike for a 
single more or less detailed way of life to fit all of us. Inclusive, generic criteria like “happiness” 
are too wide and vague to be useful in this context.11 In any case, art and religion are two of the 
existential alternatives which provide meaning. To say that art and religion “provide” us with 
existential meaning means, simply, that art or religion provides us with an experience that makes 
the receiver feel that his or her life has meaning. 
 
2.2 Intrinsic purpose and disconnecting ethical issues from 
existential ones 
 
One of the components which is often mentioned as providing meaning to life is, claims Mats 
Furberg, what we usually refer to as „purpose‟. „Purpose‟ is, much like „meaning‟, a fairly vague 
term, but may be defined as a given goal which we strive to achieve. There is, however, an 
important distinction to be made between purpose as instrumental and purpose as intrinsic. On 
the one hand an individual may have a sort of instrumental purpose which makes him or her put 
on a roll in life in order to fulfil a goal of some importance, but that goal is not necessarily 
important to the individual in question from an existential point of view; it may perhaps only be 
important to people around him or for the person‟s survival, but not much more than that. Such 
a person may, justifiably, feel like “a cog in the wheel”. Such purpose with life may, however, also 
provide a purpose in life, a purpose which has intrinsic value.12 Such intrinsic value is often 
connected to things that are more than mere survival or utility, it is not only something that one 
has to do. A tension exists between the with and the in: we may try to use a purpose with life in 
order to achieve a purpose in life, but an individual who is working at a company stacking papers 
and whose instrumental purpose therefore is constituted by stacking papers for the company in 
question may have a hard time trying to find how stacking papers day in and day out constitutes a 
meaningful occupation. Thus having a purpose with life does not necessarily mean one has 
                                                 
11 Ibid, pp. 135-7. 
12 Ibid, pp. 51-6. 
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purpose in life, and this purpose in life is what is important in order to evaluate how meaningful a 
life is. 
 Now, it seems that the purpose or goal sought when applying the Truth approach 
is found in truth, while the purpose sought when applying the Mystery approach is mystery. I 
assume that both truth and mystery, respectively, are meaningful goals. Truth, however, may 
seem more of an instrumental purpose in the sense that it is “enforced” – we “enforce” a mould 
of meaning onto art or religion by dictating the limits for what is true and what is not, what is 
meaningful and what is not. One may then argue that if one does not keep an open mind to the 
possibilities outside of this mould, this truth, meaningfulness is stifled. This limitation of 
instrumentality may even seem unethical. 
The existential value of instrumentality should not, however, be overlooked 
because of ethical reasons. While it is possible to view instrumental purpose as non-humanistic 
e.g. because humans may then be used as means towards something removed from a human 
being‟s personal properties, faculties and so on,13 it nevertheless seems to me reasonable to 
assume that human beings deliberately and happily may engage in certain actions irrespectively of 
whether these same people are mere cogs in a larger machinery or not. In other words: while 
instrumental meaning with life does not necessarily lead to meaning in life, they are not in absolute 
opposition either. The reason, I think, why this distaste towards instrumentality in existential 
matters is misdirected is that humanism is not an existential position, but an ethical one. But I 
find it logically unsound to derive the idea that no one could possibly find any meaning in being 
“put to use” from our ethical aversion towards the idea of being thus instrumentally utilised. While 
there are many purposes which may be called humanistic in the sense that they do not contravene 
any humanistic principles, it is does not follow that humanism as such (in one form or another) 
automatically brings meaning to life or that there is no individual who cannot find meaning in life 
without a more or less humanistically imbued purpose. It is true that an existentially fulfilling 
medium (e.g. aesthetics or religion) may have ethical, political or other purposes, much like Plato 
argued that because music affects our behaviour we should advocate “Apollonian” music which 
fosters order, proportion and harmony.14 But we may as well not use art for any instrumental 
purpose whatsoever; hence there seems to be no necessary connection between ethics and 
aesthetics. It seems to me that humanism or any other ethical position is exactly that: an ethical 
position, not a necessarily existential one. Therefore I believe we should, in accord with Occam‟s 
razor, beware the temptation of muddling one aspect of life with another. If the definition 
                                                 
13 Ibid, pp. 60f. 
14 R. E. Wood, Placing Aesthetics: Reflection on the Philosophic Tradition, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 2000, p. 40. 
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mentioned above is one way to explain meaningfulness in life, then ethical issues cannot disallow 
it on existential grounds, only ethical ones. 
 In order to find a somewhat universal definition of existential meaning, it must not 
be dependent on ethics or history. Yet someone like Lev Tolstoy for example, would argue that 
we not only have the ability to choose which purpose is to give our lives meaning, but that we 
must choose.15 To my mind, this is yet another instance where ethics unnecessarily meddles with 
existential issues and seems an opinion wholly dependent on a time in history (Tolstoy‟s time) 
when intellectuals deemed it necessary to choose because it befitted the ideals of freedom of the 
time. Indeed, in a modern welfare society this issue is even more accentuated: how, asks Furberg, 
can life be filled with meaning when we no longer have to be useful means, when we no longer 
have to work constantly in order to survive?16 Tolstoy seems to assume that we as human beings 
are naturally disposed to make existential choices in the sense that we always have to choose or 
find a way of our own to make our lives meaningful. A counterargument to this could be that the 
continuous freedom to choose induces anxiety in the individual; not having to choose then 
provides a sense of ease and security. 
 Yet – again considering the possible ethical importance to meaning – is it not true 
that an emphatic reaction to an existentially fulfilling work of art demands compassion in the 
receiver, a compassion which is dependent upon the receiver‟s moral abilities?17 Is it not true that 
to receive existential meaning from art would be nearly impossible should one be unable to feel 
what goes on in the psyche of another human being – the artist? This way, appreciation of art 
could be an exercise in compassion. Must not existential meaning then be dependent upon a 
certain frame of ethics? Even this line of reasoning, I think, is erroneous. While it may be true 
that we need the ability to “read” the psyche of other people in order to understand the 
emotional statement (i.e. the artwork) of another human being, this does not in itself suggest that 
compassion – or any other ethical trait – is of utmost necessity for the appreciation of art, and even 
less does it mean that we need subscribe to an ethical school in which compassion is regarded as 
the highest form of human expression. 
 It may be, then, that the limitations of the Truth approach are meaningful despite 
any ethical protests, because if people under certain circumstances are likely to enjoy being a 
mere cog in the wheel, this opens up for the possibility that the seemingly “inhumane” and 
“enforcing” Truth approach is meaningful after all. 
 
                                                 
15 Furberg, op. cit., p. 88. 
16 Ibid, pp. 131f. 
17 R. Scruton, Kultur räknas (L. Ryding, Trans.), Bokförlaget Atlantis, p. 97. 
  
12 
 
2.3 Challenge versus equilibrium in the pursuit of meaning 
 
A seemingly fundamental dichotomy in the pursuit of meaning in life is expressed by the 
question: What makes life more meaningful: a sense of challenge in life or a sense of equilibrium? 
The former suggests that mental health demands a certain tension between what has been 
accomplished and what one has yet to accomplish, a tension between the current self and the 
future self. One‟s purpose or goal in life should, according to this view, be challenging to fulfil, a 
struggle.18 The latter approach – that of equilibrium – suggests that the opposite of challenge 
must be sought in order to find meaning in life: one has to find one or more definite answers to 
one‟s existential questions – a kind of safe harbour of existence – and should seek discharge of 
tension and let mediums like those of art and religion function as a purging (catharsis) of any 
seemingly insurmountable troubles in life. 
Which is the connection, then, between the dichotomy of challenge and 
equilibrium on the one hand and the Mystery and Truth approaches on the other? The Truth 
approach creates challenge in life in the sense that if we seek truth we face the challenge of 
actively finding answers to existential questions. On the other hand, this approach also provides 
existential “safety”: we are given definite answers by God or Beethoven or whoever we feel 
sufficiently summarizes what life is about. Thus existential truths provide “plans” for life, 
blueprints that help us navigate its events and our emotional reactions to them, consequently 
providing existential equilibrium. The Mystery approach is challenging because it provides no 
clear absolutes, there are no limits as to what „God‟ may entail; we are then forced to adapt to an 
ever-changing definition of „God‟. The Mystery approach may, on the other hand, provide safety: 
the immediacy of this approach keeps us in close continuous contact with His mysteries. 
Both truth and mystery then have the capacity of providing challenge as well as 
equilibrium in life, though in different ways, and both challenge and equilibrium will be 
considered as equally meaningful forms in this essay. 
 
3. The compatibility of religion and art 
 
Religion and art are, I believe, similar when viewing them from an existential perspective. 
Religion, with its multitude of narratives and symbols, is a source of meaning in life in a similar 
way that art presents its perceivers with meaningful content through a vast array of symbols and 
metaphor. Before considering their compatibility, however, we must ask whether they are at all 
                                                 
18 V. E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, Boston, Beacon Press, 2006, p. 124. 
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separable. Here, we should take into consideration that art can be seen as a mere tool for religious 
expression and has often been exactly that: paintings of the Virgin Mary holding the infant Jesus, 
Christ on the cross and statues of saints; thangkas and mandalas; Islamic calligraphy and 
geometric patterns. Visual secular art was prevalent in the ancient world, but watching these 
works today it might be argued that they did not – in depicting everyday life among similar things 
– have the same existential function as, say, a painting by Arnold Böcklin did a few millennia later 
or that the religion and religious art did in ancient times. This would suggest that art originally or 
fundamentally is not an independent field of expression, but rather one of countless parts of 
religion. But we need only look to the ancient Greek dramas to find art that has little to do with 
the supernatural, even though the dramas in question often in some way referred to gods of 
Greek mythology or fate or otherwise divine powers. Euripides‟ tragedy Medea comes to mind, a 
play where domestic struggles, love and death are in the foreground, while references to divine 
presence has little relevance to the drama being displayed. Fast-forward two thousand and a few 
hundred years and we see the development of Romantic authors expressing deeply existential 
themes with hardly any reference at all to a supernatural reality. While modern and contemporary 
artists even to our day have indeed used their art to express themselves on supernatural 
subjects,19 art has also become an autonomous expression independent from religion. Art‟s 
secular autonomy from religion coupled with the existential expression it has in common with 
religion is the reason why I think art works as a sounding board for discussing religion in secular 
times when we feel perhaps more at home with discussing the (existential) value of art than that 
of religion. 
Once they are now separated, in order to make religion and art more comparable 
for our purposes, it is valuable to see one of them as the other. In order to gain knowledge from 
the study of art in order to say something about religion, let us then view art as religion. Doing 
so, to what does a single artwork correspond in the field of religion? Does an artwork correspond 
to a whole religion or merely a part of a religion? 
 First off, we have to consider religions and artworks as worlds onto which 
ontologies and epistemologies can be applied. Now, it is reasonable to assume that religions in 
general strive to provide a complete world which does not leave anything out: it contains a whole 
set of symbols which explain the reality around us or provides meaning in all important events of 
human life. But could a single artwork contain all of these? While some artworks are no doubt 
ambitious in commenting on a wide range of aspects of the experience of being human, it seems 
that most artworks are focused on a single or a few themes, e.g. the experience of how it is nearly 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Tuchman‟s The Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting 1890-1985, 1987. 
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impossible to be certain about anything, or – taking the theme further – the experience of having 
no certain knowledge about the mystery of death. Both of these themes apply to Shakespeare‟s 
Hamlet, and while one may read Shakespeare “religiously” and learn a lot about life and find 
existential satisfaction from reading his works, Hamlet as a single artwork can hardly be said to 
contain a “full” worldview in the way religions do.  
Perhaps the entire body of Shakespeare‟s works can be considered to cover 
“enough” subjects, enough human experience, to have the same completeness as that of a 
religion. Keeping a regular schedule of e.g. Catholic rituals, reading, singing, confessing and 
praying could be compared to Shakespeare‟s wide range of emotions and events in his works as a 
“go-to resource” for existential meaning. It seems that the major difference between an avid 
reader of Shakespeare and an ardent Catholic (assuming, for the sake of argument, there is no 
overlap) is the practise of rituals connected to Catholic faith. While a 16th century Italian farmer 
would most likely go to church for Eucharist on a regular basis, there are no typical 
Shakespearian rituals around. Book clubs and academic writing on Shakespearean themes are the 
closest to rituals we will get at this time. It is possibly also valid to speak of Shakespearean ethics, 
laws and lifestyles based on Shakespeare‟s production in a manner somewhat equal to religious 
ethics, laws and lifestyles, but these aspects are, I believe, irrelevant to a purely existential 
discussion. 
It also seems that art and religion use different “tools” to existentially support us in 
life. In coping with the death of a family member for example, art helps us cope with it by 
applying a shimmer of beauty upon it, thus bringing comfort and meaning to an event which 
otherwise appears ugly. Religion, on the other hand, puts the situation in a larger context, 
providing a sense of structure through rituals and ceremonies.20 This lets us know that the fact of 
a family member dying is “in the order of things”, e.g. it is part of the continuity of life and 
afterlife. Thus, strictly speaking, religion is meaning through context and art is meaning through 
beauty. 
Despite these differences, approaches to art and religion are comparable. In art, 
there are two basic approaches to grasping an artwork: either a description of the immediately 
given (form) or an interpretation of what is beyond form (content).21 Hence the analogy between 
the art and religion is useful to this essay because art encounters the same dilemma found in 
religion. Namely, art can be interpreted, echoing the venture for scientific truths in Descartes. 
And perhaps art indeed should be interpreted. Interpretation, however, is sometimes far from 
                                                 
20 R. Wuthnow et al., “Religion and bereavement: A conceptual framework”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 
No. 19, 1980, p. 408-422. 
21 Wood, op. cit., pp. 30f. 
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being an easy task; its difficulty might entice us to propose the argument that one should not try to 
interpret art in the first place, or that interpretation is a tool of reason which ruins art‟s 
authenticity, much like Pascal believed instrumentality ruined faith. 
While the Truth approach in religion seeks truth, the correspondent in art is 
something like an artwork‟s „contents‟, while the mystery in religion is something more akin to 
the approach of making sure that any “aboutness” is kept hidden and undetermined. Art‟s 
contents are where the meaning of an artwork is found if we apply the Truth approach to art, 
while the meaning produced by the Mystery approach can only stay intact if we avoid explanation 
of what we experience in art via some presumed content, and instead focus on the immediate 
appearance. 
 To get a better look at this condition, let us consider a typical but rather apt 
rendition of the dichotomy between the importance of artistic content versus that of an 
undefined message. In a recent French film, La vie d’Adèle (2013), two young people discuss 
books they have read. Thomas says he read de Laclos‟ novel Les Liaisons dangereuses in school, 
stating that had he read it alone without the teacher‟s explanation and analysis of each chapter, 
making it come to life, he would have missed out. Adèle, however, wonders if Thomas did not 
find that a pain, declaring that Thomas would perhaps have found his own reasons for liking the 
book had he not first had it explained to him. She finds that whenever she analyses a book, it 
closes off her imagination.22 
 In other words, Adèle claims that art should not be explained, that “aboutness” 
ruins the experience of art. As soon as we delve “beneath” the surface, thus allowing for 
conceptualisation, an artwork becomes meaningless, which would be the religious equivalent of 
getting “too close” to the gods. 
 
4. What are mystery and truth in an existential context? 
4.1 A definition of ‘mystery’ 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides the following definitions of the word „mystery‟: 
 
2a: something not understood or beyond understanding [...] 
3: profound, inexplicable, or secretive quality or character23 
                                                 
22 La vie d’Adèle, dir. Abdellatif Kechiche, Quat‟sous Films, France, 2013. 
23 ”mystery”, Merriam-Webster.com, retrieved October 9, 2014, from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/mystery 
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A central theme of the mysterious would accordingly have to do with a lack of understanding. If 
the mysterious is secretive by nature, it is something which is not only difficult to understand, but 
something we cannot fully grasp. Similarly, concerning the mystical experiences of religions, 
William James says that such an experience “defies expression, that no adequate report of its 
content can be given in words”.24 
From an existential point of view, however, we may as well replace the „cannot‟ 
with „should not‟: the mysterious is something which we should not fully understand, because from 
a Mystery approach standpoint it seems to be not only an unfortunate fact that we cannot grasp a 
mystery to its full extent, but a prerequisite in order to be able to attain the existential meaning 
which the mysterious provides, as will be explained further on. 
 
4.2 Mystery as genuineness of feeling 
 
If religious “adequacy” – i.e. the ability to accurately express the experiences of the human soul – 
is what distinguishes religious expressions that are more able to provide existential meaning from 
those that are less able to do so, a glaring problem still remains: If truth and accuracy in 
describing the human soul are the sole criteria used, we may as well be content with an academic 
text about human psychology throughout the ages in order to achieve existential satisfaction. 
There is, however, much more than intellectual truth to religion and art. Objective (or inter-
subjective) truth in itself does not make religion what it is. Author Hjalmar Söderberg found a 
similar problem, connecting the “describability” of the Truth approach with meaninglessness and 
lets his character Tyko Gabriel Glas ask: 
 
O, what is this plague that has seized people to ask about everything what it is? 
What is this scourge that has whipped them out of the remaining ring of siblings of 
creatures on Earth, out to look upon her world and her life from above, from 
without, with cold foreign eyes, and find it small and worth nothing?25 
 
Here, the truth-seeking eye destroys meaning by “knowing too much”, by making the world too 
obvious to be meaningful. Reality becomes ontologically smaller, while our epistemic access is all-
                                                 
24 James, op. cit. 
25 H. Söderberg, Doktor Glas, Stockholm, Albert Bonniers tryckeri, 1905, p. 166: ”Å, hvad är det för en pest som har 
gripit människorna att fråga om allting hvad det är? Hvad är det för ett gissel som har piskat dem ut ur den öfriga 
syskonringen af [...] varelser på jorden, ut att se på sin värld och sitt lif uppifrån, utifrån, med kalla främmande ögon, 
och finna det smått och ingenting värdt?” 
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encompassing. This obviousness is what could make any existential expression (as those in 
religion and art) lose its significance. The mystery is gone much like the fun in a joke is entirely 
ruined when the joke is explained. A similar formulation of the eye that “knows too much” is 
found in Selma Lagerlöf‟s work: 
 
But we thought of the strange ghost of self-observation which already had held its 
entry into our souls. We thought of him with the eyes of ice and the long, crooked 
fingers, he who sits in there in the darkest corner of the soul and picks our being to 
pieces, like old women pick scraps of silk and wool to pieces. [...] and thus our best 
feelings, our most primordial thoughts, all that we had done and said had been 
examined, researched, picked to pieces [...] [The ghost of self-observation sat] 
guarding by the source of actions, sneering at good and evil, comprehending all, 
condemning nothing [...] paralysing the movements of the heart and the power of 
the thought [...] [Life] had become a spectacle where he was the only spectator.26 
 
These are the sentiments of the youth after hearing the old men and women of the village 
describe how their own youth was one long adventure where they hardly reflected upon what 
they were doing. This provides another clue to the Mystery approach perspective: the magic of 
the mysterious is the lure of wonder and nostalgia, something fluttering which one cannot truly 
grasp and once one believes one has done so, it is gone. F. Scott Fitzgerald describes a 
comparable experience in The Great Gatsby, when Gatsby finally obtains the love of his life (in the 
words of the novel‟s narrator Nick Carraway): 
 
Compared to the great distance that had separated him from Daisy [the green light 
by her dock] had seemed very near to her, almost touching her. It had seemed as 
close as a star to the moon. Now it was again a green light on a dock. His count of 
enchanted objects had diminished by one.27 
 
Fitzgerald also makes this a parallel to the dream of America: 
                                                 
26 S. Lagerlöf, Gösta Berlings saga, Stockholm, Alb. Bonniers boktryckeri, 1920, pp. 160f: ”Men vi tänkte, vi, på 
själviakttagelsens underliga ande, som redan hade hållit sitt intåg i vårt inre. Vi tänkte på honom med isögonen och 
de långa, krokiga fingrarna, han, som sitter därinne i själens mörkaste vrå och plockat sönder vår varelse, såsom 
gamla kvinnor plocka sönder lappar av siden och ylle. [...] och så hade våra bästa känslor, våra ursprungligaste tankar, 
allt, vad vi hade gjort och sagt, undersökts, genomforskats, sönderplockats [...] [Själviakttagelsens ande satt] vaktande 
vid handlingarnas källa, hånleende åt ont och gott, begripande allt, fördömande intet [...] förlamande hjärtats rörelser 
och tankens kraft [...] [Livet] hade blivit till ett skådespel, där han var den enda åskådaren.” 
27 F. S. Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 97. 
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[F]or a transitory enchanted moment man must have held his breath in the 
presence of this continent, compelled into an aesthetic contemplation he neither 
understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in history with something 
commensurate to his capacity for wonder.28 
 
Thus the magic of “enchanted objects” is diminished. Similarly, religious seekers of mystery 
might protest against the conceptualisation of God: we cannot truly know Him, and as we 
desperately stretch our hands towards His true character, he becomes even more elusive, and 
should we nevertheless try to conceptualise or make real to us mere humans the nature of God, it 
would be as far from the magical, enchanted experience of God as could possibly be. 
 In Lagerlöf‟s narrative this all too objective, conceptualising eye is contrasted to 
“the fullness of life” which is exemplified by how one may, when madly in love, kiss someone in 
front of hundreds of people or fling oneself into a snowdrift to die in sheer fury. What makes the 
all too wise person a whole human being again are, in Lagerlöf‟s metaphor, the “lacerating 
griffins of passion”, who – flying with wings of fire and claws of steel on unknown ways 
impossible to observe – crush and kill the ghost of self-observation.29 
In Söderberg‟s novel, a method with which we maintain meaning can be found in a 
subjective approach: 
 
You shall look upon your world from your own point of view and not from some 
imagined point out in space; you shall modestly measure with your own 
measurement, according to your estate and your conditions [...]. Then the Earth is 
big enough and life an important thing, and the night eternal and deep.30 
 
Söderberg‟s Glas speaks of an epistemic “size” of sorts: if we are too “large”, i.e. if our knowledge 
exceeds some imagined limits, then our surroundings and, ultimately, our whole existence will 
seem small and insignificant by comparison. If we, on the other hand, limit our knowledge to our 
immediate surroundings, its periphery will seem large and, indeed, “larger than life”. According to 
William James, mystical experiences create a sense of what he calls “muchness”, and its form 
“will be intuitive or perceptual, not conceptual, for the remembered or conceived objects in the 
                                                 
28 Ibid, p. 185. 
29 Lagerlöf, op. cit., pp. 161f. 
30 Söderberg, op. cit.: ”Du skall se på din värld från din egen synpunkt och icke från någon tänkt punkt ute i rymden; 
du skall blygsamt mäta med ditt eget mått, efter ditt stånd och dina villkor [...]. Då är jorden stor nog och lifvet en 
viktig sak, och natten oändlig och djup.” 
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enlarged field are supposed not to attract the attention singly”.31 Then the limitlessness of 
mystery does not refer to the limitlessness of our knowledge, which is rather supposed to be 
confined, but the limitlessness of the world around us. This stands in opposition to the Truth 
approach where we strive for knowledge although we may not reach beyond what is logically 
possible to know (i.e. a “God‟s eye point of view”). Simultaneously, having the world around us 
be brought down to concepts, thus “limiting” its depth or, rather, pinpointing exactly how far it 
reaches, is not something existentially limiting from the point of view of the Truth approach, but 
rather a blueprint to experiencing a work of art “properly”, which is exactly why conceptual 
knowledge of the piece is important to the Truth approach. From a Mystery approach 
standpoint, on the other hand, things are the reverse: the less we know about the world, the 
argument would go, the larger the mystery becomes and therefore the greater our feelings of 
existential meaning become. 
 The genuineness of feeling and purity of emotion as opposed to conceptualisation 
as exemplified in the above quotes thus seem to be important to the human need for meaning 
and are possibly central to the idea that mystery in art and religion is more significant than the 
truth of the same. It should be remembered that, whether one seeks existential truth or mystery, 
our actual proximity to material reality – i.e. how accurate our statements are in respect to the 
material world as opposed to our experience of it – is utterly irrelevant to this study since we are 
dealing, rather, with the acquirement of existential meaning, not “truth” per se. Thus Bertrand 
Russell‟s critical survey of mysticism is supportive of and relevant to the exploration of the value 
of the Mystery approach for existential meaning: 
 
there is an element of wisdom to be learned from the mystical way of feeling, 
which does not seem to be attainable in any other manner. If this is the truth, 
mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the 
world. The meta-physical creed, I shall maintain, is a mistaken outcome of the 
emotion, although this emotion, as colouring and informing all other thoughts and 
feelings, is the inspirer of whatever is best in Man.32 
 
4.3 The sensuous aspect of aesthetics found in mystery 
 
                                                 
31 W. James, “A suggestion about mysticism”, in R. Woods (Ed.), Understanding mysticism (pp. 
215–222), Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1910/1980, p. 217. 
32 B. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, New York, W. W. Norton, Incorporated, 1929, pp. 11f. 
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With seekers of mystery being keen on keeping any message or concept out of the picture, it 
naturally begs the question, “What else is there to an artwork?” Where, it may be asked, lies the 
actual enjoyment in reading a novel or listening to a fugal composition if we do not seek a 
concept? While it seems unreasonable to denigrate intellect as such in order to achieve a sense of 
mystery, the answer to the question may be that the attempt at achieving mystery is accompanied 
by a larger focus on the more immediately perceived data brought about by human senses rather 
than a focus on intellect. 
 To showcase an example of this sensuous aspect of finding meaning in art, 
consider the way in which we may appreciate a piece of music. On the one hand, a rhythmical 
musical piece may induce in us the idea of galloping horses, much like the phrase „galloping 
horses‟ induces in us the idea or image of the same. It is even downright difficult not to get some 
kinds of ideas in our heads when we hear a piece of music. But that does not necessarily mean 
that the music is about e.g. galloping horses, nor does it mean that the function of the music is to 
induce ideas of any such thing, or any other thing at all. The meaning of the music – a seeker of 
mystery would say – is purely musical in the sense that we enjoy it because of the sheer 
excitement of that galloping-like rhythm. Or a musical piece may be constructed like an argument 
of sorts, with motifs “answering” each other, where the “winning” of the argument makes one 
feel triumphant. Hence these direct emotions are not in any way about human experience – they 
are human experience in so far as they provide a more or less immediate human appreciation of 
sound. 
 
4.4 Transcendence 
 
An aspect of immediacy is the existential experience of transcendence – the usually 
overwhelming feeling of gaining insight or access to a reality that is larger and more profound 
than “the world as we know it” – is found in both the world of art as well as that of religion. 
These are feelings that to anyone who perceives transcendence evoke an overarching pattern 
which shapes a reality beyond the empirical, sensuous reality,33 coupled with a sense of unity, 
harmony and meaning.34 We may thus gaze upon an artwork and feel ourselves part of something 
much greater than ourselves and the world immediately around us. A religious person may feel 
something similar in a church or in a temple or in nature: sense a divine presence and be given a 
hint of the ineffable greatness of God. 
                                                 
33 Furberg, op. cit., p. 45. 
34 K. Hanes, “Unusual Phenomena and Transcendent Human Experience”, The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, Vol. 
44, No. 1, 2012, p. 26. 
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4.4.1 Transcendence as mystery of all-embracing “knowledge” 
 
Söderberg complained about an approach which perceives the world “from above, from 
without”, resulting in meaninglessness. While Söderberg seems to defend ineffability to a large 
degree, his criticism of the approach which looks upon the world “from some imagined point out 
in space” can equally be interpreted as a criticism of feelings of transcendence, which itself, I 
suggest, is a sort of Mystery approach. 
In this context – where we strive to distinguish the mysterious and obscure from 
the truthful and lucid – transcendence may seem paradoxical. Transcendence is a Mystery 
approach because of its alleged ineffability, but is also, according to Söderberg‟s criticism, close to 
the Truth approach in the way that it encompasses knowledge claims that exceed even the scope 
of that approach: it claims to know of the existence of something of which it is humanly 
impossible to have any knowledge whatsoever, as claimed by Putnam in following chapters. 
 Also, feelings of transcendence seem to be situated somewhere in between the 
religious and the aesthetic. A transcendent experience can be brought about by anything from 
standing alone on a mountaintop, surveying the surrounding vistas or walking through a deep, 
snow-clad forest to fathoming the interior of a continental Gothic cathedral or joining a 
thousand man rally in the streets of a capital city. All of these are highly aesthetic experiences, a 
feast of the senses, but may also invoke a religious presence, e.g. as formulated by Knut Hamsun 
in Pan: Hamsun‟s lieutenant Glahn walks through the woods and, shouting aloud into the night, 
“a confused, passionate delight in the time and the place sends a strange shiver” through him as 
Glahn continues his monologue: 
 
“A toast to the dark and to God‟s murmuring in the trees, to the sweet, simple 
harmonies of silence upon my ear, to green leaf and yellow leaf! [...]”35 
 
This feeling of “God‟s murmuring between the trees” is an apt description of a feeling where 
something larger than life is present in extreme immediacy, i.e. in the small details of the natural 
world around us. 
 Thus mystery can be expressed in transcendent terms or transcendent experiences. 
But, as we have seen, transcendence claims knowledge, and knowledge is anathema to the 
Mystery approach. Can transcendence be seen as part of the Mystery approach considering this? 
                                                 
35 K. Hamsun, Pan: From Lieutenant Glahn’s Papers, London, Artemis Press, 1955, p. 122. 
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Because of the assumptive character of the knowledge of transcendent practices, it cannot be said 
to be of the kind of intellectual knowledge we find in the Truth approach. People who claim to 
have had transcendent experiences may indeed assume they know of something more profound 
than any intellectual Truth-seeker, that they have the knowledge of the existence of something by 
virtue of their mere experience. But if transcendence lets us know nothing about the character of 
this being, it can hardly be described as knowledge in the first place, because – as will be 
established by the notion of relative ontology in later chapters – then the identity of this 
“something” may as well be a baked potato rather than something divine. William James 
describes the paradox of this “noetic quality” of mystical experience thus: 
 
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who 
experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into 
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain 
[…]36 
 
It is this “knowledge”, I believe, which conserves mystery by enveloping the “outer reality” in a 
shroud of obscurity, where the only concept to be found is a concept of a lack of (intellectual) 
knowledge. 
 Much of this seemingly contradictory transcendence can be found in the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer. From the perspective of existential meaning, Schopenhauer focuses 
on how the world may become vast and we become small by gazing upon what he identifies as 
the Platonic Idea, the “closest” we may come to the Kantian thing in itself (or, in Schopenhauer‟s 
terminology, the Will) – precisely through overwhelming, transcendent experiences. 
Schopenhauer writes of a “will-less gaze”, an enchantment of sorts which brings us out of the 
world of relations and endows us with a rather objective view of the world. He likens it to the 
nostalgia of ages past: we imagine only the objects and the objective, not the suffering subjects 
we were. The world as will has disappeared because we have objectified the will. This experience 
is evident in viewing, for example, the clash of waves on a rocky beach at night. In viewing the 
destructive forces of nature, we realise the threat to our individual and hence our will.37 This, 
argues Schopenhauer, constitutes the sublime aspect of nature: we are enabled to observe its idea 
through the humbling experience of our possible destruction through its superior powers. But in 
realising our smallness, our near to nothingness, we simultaneously forget our individuality and 
                                                 
36 James, Varieties, op. cit. 
37 A. Schopenhauer, Världen som vilja och föreställning (E. Sköld, Trans.), Stockholm, Bonniers, 1916, pp. 291f. 
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realise how the overwhelmingly, improbably vast world exists only as an idea in us. Suddenly, the 
vastness of the world is situated in us and is dependent upon us instead of the other way around, 
enabling us – to paraphrase Shakespeare – to take fortune‟s buffets and rewards with equal 
thanks.38 In other words, we are all slaves to a transcendental aspect of reality, a puppeteer within 
ourselves, until we look back at its machinery – looking at will, not as will – and thus achieve a 
new perspective where we do not need ask existential questions at all since the answers are all 
immediately present to us. To Schopenhauer, art is a medium with which we may contemplate 
the ideas: the communication of these ideas is art‟s only aim. Art, he says, is a way of observing 
the things in the world independently of space, time and causality, which is in opposition to 
science. Schopenhauer goes on to claim that his idealist approach is complete objectivity where 
the individual delves in observing, not willing.39 Thus we lose ourselves in the objects, which is 
existentially meaningful insofar as it helps us move our focus from the self and its suffering. This 
could be equivalent to saying that we should not dwell on any emotions we may have that are 
dependent on the world around us, but move on. 
 So Schopenhauer‟s aesthetics have to do with ideas and objectivity, but not with 
existential truth in the sense presented in this essay. As mentioned above, Schopenhauer‟s will-
less gazing strives to be independent of the world where concepts matter, the world where it is 
possible to make correct and incorrect references, and instead gazes beyond towards a world that 
stands way above human experiences of love, death, sadness and joy, the human inevitabilities 
associated with existential truth. Because, as mentioned, in Schopenhauer‟s view, art is not about 
anything in this world as we normally know it, one dictated by relations, causality, time and space. 
Not long before Schopenhauer printed these ideas, music critic E. T. A. Hoffmann 
proposed something similar: the sole subject of music is the infinite and about unlocking “an 
unknown realm – a world with nothing in common with the surrounding outer world of the 
senses”. Most importantly, in what Hoffmann calls an immeasurable realm, we “abandon definite 
feelings” (my emphasis); the feeling we do have is instead that of “inexpressible longing” (my 
emphasis).40 This presents an approach to art which on the one hand perhaps claims objectivity 
and certainty, but makes no effort whatsoever to confirm its truth by means of trials in the 
outside world or other people. Instead, Hoffmann‟s approach assumes a direct connection 
between the subject and a professed transcendent realm. The feelings associated with great art 
                                                 
38 Ibid, pp. 300-3. 
39 Ibid, pp. 274-6. 
40 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Beethoven‟s Instrumental-Musik”, E. T. A. Hoffmanns sämtliche Werke, vol. 1, ed. C. G. von 
Maassen, München and Leipzig, G. Müller, 1908, (B. R. Simms, Trans.), retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://www.cengage.com/music/book_content/049557273X_wrightSimms_DEMO/assets/ITOW/7273X_INT_
07_ITOW_Hoffmann.pdf 
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according to this approach seem to have nothing to do with the universal inevitabilities of human 
experience – experiences which we have put names to and to which we can refer (and which will 
be discussed further in following chapters) – but instead have everything to do with something 
indefinite and inexpressible. 
There are, however, better and worse ways to – using Schopenhauer‟s terms – 
objectify the will, thus there are also better and worse ways to achieve feelings of transcendence. 
Depictions of animals and humans, for example, have a larger degree of such objectification than 
architecture because the former constitute more explicit revelations of the will.41 In 
Schopenhauer‟s multitude of examples, the degrees of objectification in the world of art also 
apply to different art forms, ranging from architecture on the lower end to music on the higher 
end. The lowest degrees of objectification are found in the ideas of weight, cohesion and 
firmness often apparent in architecture, while the highest degrees can be found in music, which 
directly depicts the will itself and not merely the Ideas.42 
A concept which reminds us of that of Schopenhauer‟s objectification is the 
concept of „aura‟, which relates to the mysterious and holy, the “wholly other”. Aura produces a 
sense of distance in objects even if they are close to us, but since they entrance and captivate us, 
we nevertheless wish to come close to them.43 Plate claims that even secularised art has made 
beauty a transcendent quality, and while museums have placed art outside of a ritualistic context 
they have also created a new aura surrounding the artworks on display by creating a complete 
narrative of the past, set apart from the world and the present. This need to have a “complete 
collection” thus reaches for the Schopenhauerian realm of ideas and away from our bodies. The 
message is emphasized over the medium. But while Schopenhauer‟s philosophy stresses 
historicity to be a negative aspect of art, the mystery of auras stands in contrast to modern 
technological reproduction, which in turn detaches art from tradition, ritual and any cult value by 
emphasising the medium over the message. The aura is diminished by technological mass 
reproduction and mass reception, making the evaluation of art democratized. As mentioned 
before, depictions of human beings constitute more explicit revelations of the will, of 
objectification; likewise, aura is created by the human element (faces and eyes especially), which is 
true for modern photography as well as religious iconography.44 Plate also shows how the 
medium of film hinders any attempt to reach a pure description. Through its mechanical 
reproduction of images and sounds, “objects are taken from their natural, traditional context and 
                                                 
41 Schopenhauer, op. cit., pp. 310f. 
42 Ibid, pp. 311-83. 
43 S. B. Plate, Walter Benjamin, Religion and Aesthetics, London, Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2004, p. 88f. 
44 Ibid, pp. 94f, 98, 101f. 
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given new coordinates [...]”. Thus modern technologies are finally able to keep up with the pace 
of everyday life.45 
 
4.5 What does ‘truth’ refer to in an existential context? 
4.5.1 Scientific truth and existential truth 
 
In the debate concerning belief and knowledge during the 1950s in Sweden, Ingemar Hedenius 
refused to accept the division between belief and knowledge as different in the sense that 
knowledge cannot comment upon belief. The reasoning behind this refusal was grounded in his 
unwavering demand for truthfulness. Indeed, Hedenius declared that reason will always question 
the truthfulness of a religious claim.46 
 In the ideals of Hedenius and so-called New Atheists like Richard Dawkins47 and 
Daniel Dennett48 of more recent times, truth is decidedly separated from human emotions. 
Beliefs inspired by emotions are, according to this “school” of thought, more intense than 
rational beliefs, more or less unsympathetic to rational arguments and may even be characterised 
by proceeding from an obligation of believing certain things to be true despite an exceedingly low 
probability of said things to be so. (This last criterion could be said to be the historical 
consequence of people starting to reflect upon religious belief, thus initiating a belief in belief, i.e. 
recognising the importance of belief itself. The belief in belief easily becomes as strong as or 
stronger than the original belief [e.g. in God].) 
 In this view, there is no unbridgeable gap between the language used by religious 
and non-religious people: whether or not there is a heavily symbolic use of language in religion, 
non-religious people should in principle be able to “translate” this use of language into something 
which is comprehensible to them. Nor does the emotional experience of a statement need to be 
the same between religious and non-religious people in order to understand what it means. The 
emotional function of religion is therefore, according to this view, irrelevant in seeking truth in 
religion. Thus Hedenius et al. criticise religion for appealing to emotion when making claims 
about the world. 
But is not religion existentially justified as a merely emotional outlet? Not if we 
have any rational demand for truth in what we devote ourselves to – and it seems difficult to 
argue that we do not. Because even if it would be practical or comfortable to take on a belief and 
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we wanted to do so, we cannot accept just any set of beliefs based on practicality or comfort or 
the like – we need to feel that the ideas to which we devote ourselves are true. Because who 
would want to devote oneself to a false belief? Our emotions would not “be in it” if there is no 
truth whatsoever to justify out feelings. So if we accept the demands made by the likes of 
Hedenius, Dawkins and Dennett – that the religious use of language can be translated to and 
understood by non-religious people and that religious emotions are irrelevant to its truth – then it 
may appear that science is given free reigns in religious issues and that religious claims cannot be 
justified even from an existential point of view. 
Indeed, how is it possible to save religious truth from the clutches of science? 
Although Hedenius‟ idea may appear uncompromising, he nevertheless accepted that should 
there be a satisfactory answer to the question of the relation between belief and knowledge, there 
is indeed a possibility that religious claims can be acknowledged by reason.49 While religious belief 
may not necessarily be acknowledged by reason they can be viewed as a kind of truth. Religion, 
like any form of culture, may be viewed as a source of knowledge about our human emotions and 
behaviour as transmitted through ideals, symbols and narratives.50 In other words, religion may not 
be justified as truthful by appealing to emotions, but by being about emotions. Thus religion is truth 
about emotions, not truth justified by emotions. That is the compromise which saves religion 
from irrelevance when it comes to saying something true about the world and may validate its 
focus on human emotions, thus possibly providing a satisfactory answer to Hedenius‟ question 
about the relation between belief and knowledge, or emotion and truth.  
 The kind of truth discussed here can be labelled existential truth, a truth which 
corresponds to the human soul and the collective knowledge about it, a description of the human 
psyche. It is exemplified in the ideas of Martin Luther. According to Peder Thalén, if the question 
of the truth of God‟s existence is central to Hedenius‟ criticism of religious belief, it is entirely 
irrelevant to the likes of Luther. To him, God‟s visibility is about God‟s salvific activity, not about 
an intervention in the outer course of events.51 Thalén says that Luther describes how faith in 
God liberates man from identifying with his incomplete nature, our “inner boundary”. To 
identify with faith implies that one is no longer a prisoner in one‟s own self-reliance. Self-reliance 
usually leads to hopelessness, which Luther, says Thalén, equates with the absence of God. The 
darkness inside is, however, something which God takes care of, thus the believer‟s imperfections 
die away by themselves. This is, unlike Hedenius‟ interpretation of religious belief, not some 
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mysterious circumstance which we cannot confirm in our experience.52 Rather, in historical 
Christianity, God‟s presence is empirically verifiable and falsifiable. One example is how man‟s 
inadequacy is easily tested by examining to which degree she fulfils the commandments of God. 
Hence Christian knowledge is self-knowledge.53 
 Another way of expressing this self-knowledge, is saying that religion and art treat 
images, narratives and ideas about the inevitabilities of life such as death, suffering, love, 
happiness and guilt.54 Every human being will, it seems, sooner or later encounter these 
inevitabilities. We have all either experienced the death of loved ones or at least considered our 
own mortality. We have all suffered in one way or another and contemplated upon why there is 
suffering in the world and how we might accept our own suffering, to fight it, adapt to it or to 
accept it. We have all pondered the mystery called love, the experiences of falling in love, being 
loved, losing love or the feelings of not being loved at all. We have all had feelings of guilt or 
shame and vacillated between its denial, justification and redemption. Art and religion have the 
ability to treat the feelings we have regarding these inescapable events; art specifically uses beauty 
to either console us in matters of sorrow or confirm our joy, to even imbue images of death with 
majesty or serenity. This way, humanity has found meaning even in the most tormenting 
moments in life: a work of art can make us appreciate the beauty of things concerned with death 
or sorrow itself, reminding us that life – despite its horrors – is worth living because of its 
inherent beauty, which in itself appears to provide meaning to people‟s lives. In religion, the same 
situation – death or sorrow – is put into relation to a supernatural reality, making us feel whole 
despite loss. Both art and religion then provide us with a sense of redemption, a sense that 
everything is all right after all. 
These inevitabilities could be said to be empirically unobservable,55 but even then 
we can speak of true and false statements in religion and art by making the statements dependent 
upon our conceptualisations of our experiences grounded in the existential (rather than in the 
observable). Existential experiences encounter resistance from reality much in the same manner 
in which observable experiences do,56 hence we are able to verify or falsify religious statements 
and aesthetic statements (i.e. art). In Eberhard Herrmann‟s words: 
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When people reflect about love, for example, they try to form some idea of it with 
the help of literature, theatre, film, art, and religion. They may also compare their 
own shortcomings and disappointments, and try to form an idea of what pure love 
might be. In this way, love becomes a limit concept. For believers, it seems natural 
to call this pure love God. What is said about God is then not true or false because 
it agrees or does not agree with the reality conceptualized by us which offers 
resistance to us in our observational experiences. Instead, it is true or false depending 
upon whether it agrees or does not agree with the reality conceptualized by us 
which offers resistance to us in our existential experiences.57 
 
Thus existential truth is anchored in the knowledge of our conceptualisation of the human soul. 
It shapes us as human beings from a psychological point of view and reflects our lives in myriads 
of ways as seen in the arts and in religion. Existential truth supports us in our lives by giving 
authoritative and beautiful answers to what it means to be human. 
 
4.5.2 The generalised human soul – existential truth as collective 
constant 
 
So, seeking Truth, religion and art become media that have to do with the self, the human soul, 
which inevitably contains experiences and emotions concerning things as diverse as death and 
happiness, despair and love. These inevitabilities are represented or presented as subjects in 
religion and the arts. 
This is an adequate response to Hedenius‟ demand for truth in religion because in 
order for existential truth to be comparable to scientific truth and its verifiability and falsifiability, 
existential truth needs to be grounded in something constant which does not haphazardly change 
the outcome of experimental trials. Existential truth is, as mentioned above, anchored in the 
knowledge of the human soul, a canvas of emotions and experiences which every human being 
encounters sooner or later in life.  
But how do we prove whether or not there is existential truth contained in e.g. a 
specific artwork? In order to do that and for our interpretation to be useful not only to our 
individual selves, but to all people, the artwork must prove to be appreciated in a similar manner 
by other people. Other people – other human souls – are therefore another grounding of 
existential truth. Now, in the same manner as we cannot test a scientific theory an infinite 
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amount of times in the physical world, an artwork‟s appeal cannot reasonably be tested on every 
human being. Instead, we have to refer to the collective knowledge of what the “average” human 
soul is like, gathered throughout the ages within a culture or civilisation and in recent times 
expressed in scientific fields such as psychology. This body of knowledge I think refers to an 
imagined “generalised” human soul, generalised in the sense that it is an image of the character of 
the human soul based on a multitude of experiences of a multitude of people throughout the 
history of a culture. (It is also what, among other things, brings us a canon of literature, which 
tells us that e.g. Shakespeare is a “good read”.) 
This generalised image is what may serve as a constant for existential truth in 
correspondence to how the physical world and its laws serve as a constant for truth in the natural 
sciences. The consistency and universality of the generalised human soul will, however, have to 
be relative to any given culture because it seems that tertiary emotions – such as love, happiness 
and ambition – which constitute a large part of the thematic content of art and religion are not 
hardwired in our brains (which is the case with primary emotions – pain, pleasure and fear, 
among others – and secondary emotions – affection, sorrow, sympathy and anger, among 
others), but dependent on culture.58 The evolutionary background of the “openness” of the 
human brain has to do with environmental complexity: every stimulus cannot be predicted and 
therefore a response cannot be hardwired for every stimulus.59 The mental life of the average 
person of any given culture is therefore shaped by that culture and might be dissimilar or even 
very different from the mental life of the average person of another culture. 
This means that the tertiary emotions and experiences written, sung and talked 
about in e.g. ancient Greece are truthful to modern Westerners not necessarily because those 
emotions are globally universal, but perhaps because ancient Greek culture have had a strong 
impact on the art and religion of the modern West. It seems that the reason why a Greek tragedy 
can feel so contemporary when we read it today is because the core of the existential questions of 
the Western world has changed remarkably little. Medea, for example, is relevant to this day.60 
Correspondingly, the physical world and its laws have not changed dramatically 
during mankind‟s beginnings. This condition lets us test basic physical principles without 
unpredictable results, and the relative consistency of a culture lets us test e.g. artworks. If our 
human needs correspond to existential questions and these are constant in a culture, then, 
assumedly, answers to these questions are never entirely obsolete either, but rather true or false. 
                                                 
58 L. Greenfeld, Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 2013, pp. 79-84. 
59
 Ibid, pp. 61f. 
60 L. Swift, “Medea is as relevant today as it was in Ancient Greece”, The Conversation, 2014, retrieved October 27, 
2014, from http://theconversation.com/medea-is-as-relevant-today-as-it-was-in-ancient-greece-29609 
  
30 
 
 
4.6 What is existential falsity? 
 
I have mentioned existential “Answers” in connection to the Truth approach: we may wish to 
find answers to our existential questions, which means that we want profoundly formulated 
confirmations of what we have experienced psychologically. We want to be seen and understood. 
So in a sense, existential truth in e.g. art is a confirmation that someone else has seen us, has seen 
our souls, and empathises with our lot. It shows us that the artist has understood something 
about life, something about us, and so we feel existentially supported by how well the artist has 
expressed this truth about us, bringing about a sense of existential community. 
 If, however, there is existential truth, this “beautiful empathy”, there must also be 
existential falsity. What that is exactly is less easy to enunciate. Is it possible for any artwork to be 
false? Can an artist be so incompetent or emotionally ignorant that he or she fails to express truth 
about any of the existential inevitabilities which humans experience? I believe we should not, 
however, talk about truth or falsity on an absolute scale of yes or no, but rather about grades of 
truth. Surely an artist may misunderstand human endeavours, misrepresent it or express it in 
inadequate ways; but no artist would, I assume, ever think of the inevitability of death in terms of, 
say, shoes (other than in metaphor), and it is not the case that all other artists express themselves 
flawlessly as to what it means to be human. Artworks are, rather – as we have all probably 
experienced – more or less existentially true. 
 But what would it mean to say that an artwork is existentially false? What would a 
practical example look like? The most striking example, which most people will be able to relate 
to and which accentuates a gradual shift, is that of literature, cinema or music that meant the 
whole world to us when we were adolescents, but are now things that we ignore, merely feel 
nostalgic about or are even embarrassed about. We may find that a certain film that we watched 
over and over again as teenagers is now trivial; it may be entertaining still, but it simply does not 
speak to us the way it used to, because we feel it does not understand us as the human beings we 
have become and the things we have now experienced. So, if we find that we are no longer able 
to connect with an artwork, it has become (more) existentially false (i.e. less true) to us. 
 
5. Epistemological and ontological limitations of Truth and Mystery 
 
As an expansion of Muhammad Iqbal‟s notion of the difference between mystical experience as a 
unification of subject and object on the one hand and “ordinary rational consciousness” as 
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isolating stimuli into a divided,61 conceptualised world, I suggest that part of the difference 
between Truth and Mystery has to do with different limitations set in these approaches‟ 
epistemology and ontology respectively. The Truth approach constrains the ontological domain: 
the outer world should be defined and conceptually divided into a manageable whole. 
Epistemologically, the limits should be set only at what is logically impossible to know, but other 
than that we should strive to know as much as possible. This calls to mind the scientist at work: 
trying to make as little as possible of the world unknown, trying to explain as much as possible 
and retrieving knowledge from the same world within an epistemic frame which is flexible 
(“unlimited”) when it comes to possible ontologies because truth is a continuous process of trial 
and error, verifiability and falsification. 
 Thus seeking existential truth in an artwork like Graham Greene‟s 1951 novel The 
End of the Affair, one should assume that it is possible to conceptualise the novel as a whole, even 
to manage to apply a concept to it that is a “perfect fit” or the only one correct interpretation of 
what its story is about and – most importantly – what its main subject is about. One should, 
however, accept that one‟s current concept to match the novel could be “wrong” or at least that 
there could be a better one, a better fit for what the novel is about. In any case, to understand the 
book as thoroughly as possible and to give it an as all-encompassing and yet adequate concept as 
possible, is the whole point of the Truth approach. So to my mind, for example, The End of the 
Affair is an existential drama about the relationship between love and hate, which in turn is put in 
relation to human and divine bonds respectively. It is a book that asks the question: If we do not 
have the ability to love other people because we do not dare trust them, how could we possibly 
trust and love God? Thus we have conceptualised and found some existential truth in Greene‟s 
work, because it says something truthful about what it is like to be human. 
If, on the other hand, we wish to pursue the Mystery approach, we want to know 
little and understand little all in order to maintain the mystery of the artwork in question. This is 
indubitably how anything of mysterious character is created: little is known. Thus while 
epistemologically restrained, the limits of the outside world (which includes artworks and 
religious statements) not only should remain limitless, but also becomes limitless as a logical result of 
a self-imposed restriction of knowledge. This also makes mystery devoid of context. Director 
David Lynch explains: 
 
If you were in a room and there was an open doorway, and stairs going down and 
the light just fell away, you‟d be very tempted to go down there. When you only see 
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a part, it‟s even stronger than seeing the whole. The whole might have a logic, but 
out of its context, the fragment takes on a tremendous value of abstraction.62 
 
Abstraction makes the small appear vast by value of what we do not see. Thus it is with God: the 
less possible it is for us to define Him, the more immense and profound He appears – as 
equivalent to the “stronger” experience of only seeing a part of a staircase. So the Mystery 
approach makes God (ontology) seem greater because our epistemology (definition of Him) is 
constrained. Perhaps we do not want to understand the logic of The End of the Affair, but only 
experience it as a constant “now”, a fragmentary whole. The Mystery approach therefore makes 
things appear grand and important, while the Truth approach bring the artwork down from the 
“divine” realm, down to earth. 
From this perspective, the point of the Truth approach is that while it may not 
make things seem grand and important, it provides something which we, mere mortals, may 
relate to, things that are part of lives that are not infinite, but dependent upon time, space, 
causality and context. The Lynchian staircase may not seem grand anymore once we have gone 
down those stairs and seen what is there, but at least we know how it relates to our lives. If we 
know the theme of a painting we can relate that theme to experiences we have had in our lives 
before. If God is less enigmatic, less ineffable or even less impervious, He is also easier to relate 
to what we go through in life as human beings. This way, God, by virtue of being representative 
or “highest provider” of existential justification, and the Truth approach making God relate to 
the inevitabilities of life, religion becomes deeply meaningful to us. 
So when it comes to aesthetics, having the world around us be brought down to 
concepts – thus “limiting” its depth or, rather, pinpointing exactly how far it reaches – is not 
something existentially limiting if we seek truth. On the contrary, I suggest that such 
conceptualisation serves as a blueprint to experiencing a work of art “properly”, which is exactly 
why conceptual knowledge of the piece is important to anyone who claims that an artwork must 
be about something and that we must figure out what. For those who seek the mysterious aspect 
of an artwork, however, things are reversed: the less we know about the world – the argument 
would go – the larger the mystery becomes and therefore the more intense our feelings of 
existential meaning become. 
Now, if we let a whole religion and not merely its divine realm constitute the 
ontology, i.e. if what we believe exists is conditioned by a certain religion, then everything we do 
in our religious lives – the transmission and acquisition of its narratives and symbols, rituals and 
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sermons, and so on – will have a different effect on us existentially depending on which approach 
we choose. I suggest that the Mystery approach will – if we follow the same logic as outlined 
above – make the narratives seem to hint at unending worlds in both time and space, the rituals 
make us feel a part of not only an intense “now”, but an “always”, because most rituals are 
characterised by how they have always been performed a certain way and always will be 
performed a certain way, thus connecting us with a perpetual chain of recurring events. 
Epistemologically, i.e. what knowledge with which a religion provides us, the mystery-seeking 
believer may, in a Christian context, recognise concepts like God, Jesus, Messiah, crucifixion, 
salvation and so on, and believes these particular concepts are essential to his or her faith, but will 
only have them summarise the overall mysterious feeling of faith. A Christian person of mystery-
seeking bent reads the gospels, but – if the Mystery approach is meticulously followed – does not 
relate them to his or her own confrontations with the inevitabilities of life.  
A Truth-seeking Christian, however, would pay attention to any answers the 
Christian narrative may have to his or her questions regarding how he or she should relate to the 
inevitable collisions with death, love, hate, joy and shame, not from an ethical point of view (e.g. 
the Decalogue), but from an existential one where the narrative provides reflective support and 
understanding regarding these issues. Ontologically, the Truth approach isolates religious aspects 
in the sense that it makes the narratives, rituals and sermons relative to our own earthly lives. 
Because religion becomes important to the inevitabilities of life, the religious world (i.e. the world 
as conditioned by religion) has to be of a manageable “size”, not an infinity without interpreting 
possibilities. 
 
6. Epistemic clarity: Ambiguity versus objectivity 
 
As discussed above, the Mystery and Truth approaches have opposite epistemological attitudes 
which will be explored further in the following pages. In the Mystery approach, the prevalent 
attitude seems to be that of ambiguity: a seeker of mystery perceives an artwork and endeavours 
to keep its “aboutness” in flux. In the Truth approach, one tries to explain what the sights and 
sounds of an artwork appear to communicate, and only then is meaning possible. To properly 
anchor the aboutness of an artwork, the Truth approach benefits from an objectivist view where 
the truth of a painting or a song or a novel is established not only by the individual, but also by as 
many fellow human agents as possible, thus supporting that the analysis of the artistic object in 
question is a definite evaluation, an objective opinion of how accurately it relates to human 
experience, thus avoiding mysterious ambiguity. In other words, the Mystery approach seeks 
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ambiguity in order to keep the aesthetic mystery intact, while the Truth approach seeks 
objectivity in order to keep aboutness intact. 
 
6.1 Symbols, allegories and signs as epistemic tools 
 
Introducing allegorical aesthetics, S. Brent Plate describes allegory as an encoded language in 
which there is a split between appearance and meaning, unlike in the symbol, where form (a 
word, an image or other) and content (the metaphysical idea) constitute a unity. Allegory is of a 
more “fleeting, subversive” character and opens up to multiple meanings due to subjective 
interpretations in its viewers, while symbols are stable and deeply imbedded in culture, 
representing single meanings.63 
Plate sees a problem in how beauty is reliant on “socially inherited concepts of 
symmetry, perfection, unity and harmony” and easily forgets its own earthbound nature. As a 
counterpoise to this, the allegorist is an inventor who works by way of selecting (metaphor) and 
arranging (metonymy) from “ruins” (fragments), unable to build a unified structure or even a 
finished artwork, thus arresting the process of death and decay. Allegory is consequently an 
irruption of “the profane into the sacred, the physical into the spiritual, death into the eternal, 
turning the mythic symbol inside out”.64 It could further be said that allegory takes wholes apart, 
emphasizing the passage between the profane and the sacred. The aim then is to make religion 
review itself and promote reform. So, in order to make them useful in the historical present, 
allegory turns esoteric mythic symbols inside out to make them physical and perceivable to our 
senses, thus keeping the appearance intact.65 
To mystic and artist William Blake, however, the relation is the reverse. Allegory is 
an intellectual literary device arising from Memory, while symbols, on the other hand, rise from 
the subconscious, and are further associated with what Blake calls Vision, Imagination and 
Inspiration. The whole point of an allegory, claims Blake, is to understand what it stands for – 
that is its function. A symbol has a wholly different function in that its meaning should not be too 
obvious.66 Terminologically then, Plate‟s and Blake‟s views are each other‟s opposites. Blake‟s 
intellectual allegory has more in common with Plate‟s united symbol: the point is to “figure it 
out”, which would make much sense indeed if its form and content are directly connected. 
Likewise, the device Blake calls symbol associated with imagination and ambiguity is indicative of 
                                                 
63 Plate, op. cit., pp. 40, 46-50. 
64 Ibid, pp. 68f. 
65 Ibid, pp. 77-80. 
66 S. F. Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake, Providence, Brown University Press, 1988, 
p.17. 
  
35 
 
Plate‟s subversive allegory. No matter which terminology we use, however, the two authors seem 
to agree conceptually on a clear and consistent distinction between mystery and truth as 
properties in art, where the mystery sought by the Mystery approach corresponds to Plate‟s 
allegory and Blake‟s symbol, and the truth sought by the Truth approach corresponds to Plate‟s 
symbol and Blake‟s allegory. If we transfer the properties of symbols and allegories to truth and 
mystery, we can say that truths have stable, single meanings connected to memory, while 
mysteries are subversive and subjective entities connected to the subconscious. (Since Blake 
appears to despise allegories and enjoy symbols, and Plate seems to despise symbols and enjoy 
allegories, it consequently seems that both are mystery-seekers at heart.) The connection Blake 
makes between memory and truth (or allegory) makes more sense if we remember the connection 
between truth and conceptualisation: we conceptualise art in order to conceive its truth, and a 
concept works as a mnemonic device to focus our minds on what the artwork is about. 
 
6.2 Mystery as artistic ambiguity 
 
In order to reach a genuineness of feeling it seems important to keep conceptualisations as far 
away from the experience of the artwork as possible. In art, this could mean that the “aboutness” 
of an artwork is kept in constant unrest. While the Truth approach involves analysing an artwork 
until we have managed to conceptualise it and thus understood what it is “about”, the Mystery 
approach involves viewing the artwork as an unexplainable unknown which has no fixed 
definition. This is sometimes true of the artists themselves as well: Hannah Höch, for example, 
has worked with the possibility of intentionally creating art without a fixed and final meaning. 
Rather, by employing an aesthetic strategy of distanced irony, a piece of art may oscillate between 
different allegorical readings. This strategy serves to make an idea impossible to possess, fix or 
collect.67 In other words, the truth of, say, a painting by Titian, is not something that we, 
according to this view, are able to or even supposed to be able to grasp. 
 
6.2.1 Ambiguity as learning process 
 
But wherein lies the existential value of ambiguity in an artwork? One answer could be that when 
a work of art presents a subject where its truth is not set in stone, where many simultaneous, 
possible truths hover about during our perception of the work, it resembles our own struggle to 
understand our lives, our surroundings and our place in this world. Ambiguity would then serve 
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the function of simulating a learning process. By contrast, the Truth approach is keen on 
reaching a conclusion, a closing, a specification of a more or less definite answer to any existential 
question we may ask. So, although the Mystery approach does not ever have any possible answer 
in mind at all, the value of that approach in an epistemic context seems to be about the process 
of trying to reach such an answer, that the journey is more important than the destination. It may 
seem contradictory to associate the ambiguity of mystery with a learning process because learning 
means knowledge and knowledge has truth, but people may find the whole inevitable learning 
process of life to be meaningful not because of what they learn, but because of the struggle to 
achieve such learning (which is used in other areas than existential meaning). The ambiguity of an 
artwork may then become meaningful because we can identify with that ambiguity. This idea 
connects with Plate‟s (in Chapter 6.1) on how allegory emphasizes the passage between the 
profane and the sacred. 
 In a film, for example, a director may invoke this sense of an ambiguous learning 
process through various aesthetic tropes (such as the modulation of visual space), independently 
of plot and regardless of where the story of the film is going. This should not be confused with 
the Truth approach where we assume the concept of a learning process, i.e. where we can say that a 
film is about a learning process (story) or that the film had something to say about learning 
processes in general (theme). Rather, someone using the Mystery approach would say that a 
(good) film is a learning process, while any theme or story derived from it is largely irrelevant. 
 The learning process could be said to constitute an important aspect of experience 
as such. When John Milton‟s Satan explores the world beyond the safe boundaries of God, the 
beauty and meaning derives from simply being alive, not from any received knowledge, which 
could explain William Blake‟s suggestion that Milton was at his most passionate when penning 
the arguments of the Devil.68 As counterintuitive as it may appear, ambiguity – not truth – would 
then comprise the supreme motivating force in human endeavours. 
 
6.2.2 Does the mystery-seekers have “too much to lose” from art 
analysis? 
 
The analysis of art moves the perceiver of an artwork from the experience of the work of art to 
an outside perspective. If we prefer the Mystery approach to art, thus considering art appreciation 
to be a discipline chiefly concerned with immediate, sensuous perception, then we are justly 
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provoked by the idea that one should instead place focus on questioning an artwork‟s contents 
rather than what it does to a perceiver of the artwork here and now: once analysed, there is, from 
a Mystery approach point of view, a risk that the power of the artwork wanes and is unable to 
amaze us the way it used to because it is impossible to take back the “innocent” point of view 
one once held. Much like Wittgenstein‟s ambiguous “duck-rabbit” image,69 an artwork may be 
seen as either an object to be interpreted or an object which is simply to be enjoyed as is. And 
once Wittgenstein‟s duck has turned into a rabbit in our minds, it may be difficult to return to 
seeing it as a duck. Similarly, seeing an artwork without the eyes of the interpreter – who only sees 
whether the artwork is existentially true or not – may be equally difficult once the artwork has 
been interpreted; hence the meaning in immediate, non-interpretative perception of an artwork is 
lost. Once interpreted, an artwork may be impossible not to view without (that) interpretation in 
mind. 
So from where does mystery derive its meaning if there is no conceptualisation at 
all? Immediacy has been discussed in Chapter 4.3 and will now be connected to the discussion of 
the epistemology and ontology of the Mystery approach. If the Mystery approach keeps us 
epistemologically limited, this implies that there is much more of “imagined” (unexplored) 
ontology to be gained, an ontology that is practically unlimited. We can assume this from e.g. the 
argument that words diminish feelings: a concept is an abstraction which has transformed 
something seemingly infinite or timeless to a manageable size, and yet – we complain – the 
concept is never enough, it never fully describes what an experience or feeling is. Now, with that 
infinity still intact immediacy is allowed to inhabit a limitless world. Keeping conceptualisations 
out of it becomes important because it limits that world and therefore might hinder the 
continuous flow of feeling at one with a constant Now.  
The reference to hope may also seem like an argument for the existentially satisfying 
effect of the Mystery approach. This argument states that although mystery renders an 
ontological vast unknown, there is nevertheless hope that e.g. there is indeed a God out there who 
has the Answers, „answers‟ in the sense that if the question is “Is not life so?”, then the answer is 
a comforting “Indeed, and how”. Hope is an assumption about what is there, in the work of art 
or in the ineffability of God, even if we cannot know about it, at least not by means of words. It 
is an assumption that this unknown entity must be exceedingly vast and profound. We do not 
know of its boundaries, shape or size, but this also provides the freedom to believe ourselves to 
know that it is larger than anything – more inclusive than any modalities and categories of things – 
which we could possibly imagine; hence an exceedingly great meaningfulness might also be there, 
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one great Answer to all our existential questions. So while ambiguity in religion could be seen as 
an existential problem, it has existential value as well. A God with unclear motives may seem like 
He would warrant a merely cruel existence for human beings, but ambiguity also makes God 
seem greater, which may serve as an existentially fulfilling circumstance in times when God does 
appear to have a “plan”: not only does God have a plan, he is a great god with a (presumably) 
great plan, resulting in the safety and harmony mentioned in 2.3: no matter what happens, God 
justifies the most unfathomable events; we do not know how or why, but God is the counter-
weight that always secures equilibrium. 
 But the above argument is faulty as a Mystery approach argument because hope – as 
explained in this context – is the Mystery approach viewed through a Truth lens. The Mystery 
approach is not concerned with whether God is great or not: it is an immediate connection to the 
divine world, no questions asked, no answers given. If we view both approaches as 
communications with the divine realm, the Truth approach makes the ultimate message of God a 
distant point which we may strive for, while the Mystery approach is already in immediate 
connection with what makes religion meaningful, hence the Mystery approach asks nothing more 
from God than that sensuous immediacy. The question of hope in the Mystery approach only 
seems to occur when truth issues “invade” it. For example, if a person in search for truth asks a 
person in search for mystery whether or not God is great and whether He has all the Answers, 
the question shapes the assumed ontology into a landscape of questions and answers rather than 
a feast for the senses, whereby the latter person feels forced to say, “Well, probably” – because so 
far the seeker of mystery has assumedly only had existentially satisfying experiences of the 
immediate connection with the divine realm – and thus gets thrown into a debate on the Truth 
side of the pitch even though it does not and should not concern him or her. 
So, brushing that argument aside, we are nevertheless left with sensuous immediacy 
(in an ontologically limitless realm) in the Mystery approach‟s defence. Now, while it first off 
seems that striving for an Answer will diminish immediacy, it might also – on top of that – 
provide an unsatisfactory Answer. What if the Truth analysis happens to offer existential falsity, not 
existential truth? What if that artwork is a disappointment once it has been analysed? And what if 
the possible satisfactory Answer is not satisfactory enough to make the Truth “gamble” worth a 
shot? The existential gain of sensuous immediacy perhaps exceeds the existential gain received by 
the possibility that the Answer is unsatisfactory.  
This is where hope finds its true colours: as an aspect of the Truth approach. If we 
strive to find existential truth, a psychological “gamble” is automatically implied: we either find 
the existential answer to be truthful or false. Naturally, we hope to find truth, and hope, in turn, 
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implies expectations. Expectations, if not met, result in disappointment. This means that if we do 
not find truth when expecting truth, we are not back to “neutral ground”, at “square one”. If we 
are disappointed (or even filled with despair), we are existentially less satisfied than we were at the 
outset of trying to find existential truth. The worst case scenario of the Truth approach, then, is 
that we not only lose that sensuous immediacy in a mystical, limitless world, but also left in 
despair brought on by disappointment. And, more importantly for the question as to which 
approach to choose, considering the significance of these assumptions, the average amount of 
existential meaning provided by the Truth approach seems to be less than the existential meaning 
provided by the Mystery approach. 
A rough sketch of an anti-Truth argument from the above discussion could look 
like this: Assuming – all other things being equal – that  
 
1. seeking truth results in either a) a satisfactory answer (or +1) or b) an unsatisfactory 
answer (-1) and that the average satisfactoriness of these two is neither satisfactory 
nor unsatisfactory (or 0), and that  
2. the reluctance of the Mystery approach to seek an answer at all renders it existentially 
neutral (or 0) in the context of “aboutness”, but since 
3. the Mystery approach also entails sensuous immediacy, and  
4. sensuous immediacy is meaningful, we arrive at the conclusion that 
5. the Mystery approach is, on average, more meaningful than the Truth approach, which 
is why 
6. one should choose the Mystery approach if looking for existential meaning in religion 
and art. 
 
Thus the average amount of meaning provided by the combination of an unsatisfactory answer 
and a satisfactory answer is less than the meaning provided by not finding out at all and simply 
relish in the sensuous immediacy of religious life. 
From this point of view, there is simply too much to lose from engaging in the 
Truth approach. The Mystery approach is not about talking, it is about living. While an approach 
bent on truth, calculation and analysis cannot help but lay a sceptic eye on most things and 
blemish each experience by looking at it from afar, mystery-seekers live the universe which is 
created without any second thoughts as to where it may lead. 
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6.2.3 Ambiguity: a flight from manipulation? 
 
Since mystery-seekers are concerned with authenticity, one aspect of art which might undermine 
its existential meaning is the feeling of being manipulated, i.e. the feeling that an agent – in this 
case the artist – abusively strives to change your perception or behaviour for their own gain and 
at your expense. The perceiver of art may feel that he or she has not experienced something 
authentic, something important, but rather something put on show for ulterior motives. 
 This feeling of manipulation may, for example, come to pass when overt 
sentimentality is used to induce emotions. If, in theatre, an old man on the stage stares at the 
audience with “puppy eyes” in order to induce sympathy, the mechanics of emotional effect in 
the art may become too obvious and we are suddenly aware of the “puppet master” behind the 
scene rather than the mysterious world created by the artist. As Oscar Wilde suggests, “To reveal 
art and to conceal the artist is art‟s aim”.70 Thus, if the artist is revealed in the artwork, it takes 
focus away from the aesthetic experience. It could be argued that because the Mystery approach 
does not analyse art it does therefore not reveal anything, neither the art (theme, story and so on) 
nor the artist. The argument would go that the Truth approach, by contrast, puts us in a frame of 
mind which opens us to the reading of not only an artwork‟s concepts, but also of the intentions 
of the artist, intentions which could look disingenuous. 
 The parallel problem in religion would constitute the manipulation of religion for 
profane means: the feeling that our susceptibility to religious feelings is abused by e.g. ministries 
and preachers, or the feeling that the written word is not sincere.  
But we are always manipulated in one way or another. It is possible for the Truth 
approach to focus on theme, not artist; on art, not the extra-aesthetic world. If the feeling of 
manipulation occurs, we are beyond the scope of aesthetic and religious truth: we are delving into 
the realm of “intentional truth” (i.e. trying to understand the intentions of artist), and these are 
not relevant to existential meaning, as will be further discussed in Chapter 6.3.2.1. 
A counter-argument to this could say that it is nevertheless within the religious or 
aesthetic realm this feeling occurs: the artist could have sincere intentions and still seem 
manipulative, a condition caused not by moral but artistic shortcomings. In other words, 
independently of the actual intentions of the artist, the artwork may still seem manipulative and 
the Truth approach may reveal such conditions, such truths. 
This argument, however, assumes that all analysed artworks provide us with a 
feeling of being manipulated. While the Mystery approach does perhaps shield us from all 
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feelings of manipulation by means of keeping the ambiguous character of art intact, the risk of 
chancing upon a manipulative artwork when using the Truth approach is entirely dependent 
upon, again, the competence or shortcomings of the artist. 
This is always the risk of seeking truth: that the answer we seek is not satisfactory. 
Thus we are back at the dilemma mentioned in the Chapter 6.2.2: is not the amount of meaning 
gained from the sensuous immediacy of mystery larger than that gained from the possibility of an 
unsatisfactory answer? 
 
6.2.4 Inference: How can truth be worth the risk? 
 
In earlier chapters we found that meaning in mystery primarily comes from limitless sensuous 
immediacy and that truth might ruin that limitlessness. The Truth “gamble” may not be worth it if 
we already have meaningful immediacy because the average amount of meaning of “gambling” is 
less than keeping to immediacy only. 
 So, if we are to choose the Truth approach over the Mystery approach we must be 
convinced that there is more to the Truth approach than the average existential meaning of a 
satisfying answer and an unsatisfying one. So, unless we are risk-takers enough to venture the 
jeopardy anyway, we must be convinced that the “gamble” is somehow worth the risk, that the 
average amount of meaning extracted by means of the Truth approach at least equals that of the 
Mystery approach. 
The following chapters will delve deeper into the character of the Truth approach 
where we might find a sufficient answer to this dilemma. 
 
6.3 Truth as objective content in the arts 
 
If truth and mystery are to be divided in the realm of the arts, I contend that truth in an artwork 
is found in its contents as opposed to its immediate surface values. This is because the content of 
an artwork is its themes, which are answers to the inevitabilities of human experience. So what an 
artist has to say about the horrible and wonderful experiences of joy, shame, death and hope are 
exactly the themes which are brought up as the contents in works of art. Finding truth in content 
is then, if we support this approach, more existentially meaningful than finding enjoyment in the 
immediate and keeping the mysterious aspect intact. 
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6.3.1 What is aesthetic content? 
 
According to idealist aesthetics, beyond or underlying the appearance of an artwork are its 
contents. „Content‟ is synonymous to an interior idea, theme, concept or “spirit” of an artwork. 
Indeed, idealist aesthetics sometimes go to the extreme, proclaiming that art is merely a vessel, a 
container, of an idea. 
The notion of content in art is equivalent to the notion of what artists try to convey, 
and to the spectator this is grasped by his or her cognitive faculties rather than only sense 
perception. Art and art criticism in this view mainly becomes an intellectual practice. While 
congregational members of a church may appreciate the rituals, the prayers and believe in God as 
described in holy scripture, there is a further step to be taken to understand what it all means. In a 
similar manner to that of a conceptual interpretation of an artwork, a conceptual interpretation of 
religion pertains to unearthing and internalising what is the religion‟s ultimate philosophy and 
how it relates to human experience. Consequently, the Truth method of deriving meaning from 
content (i.e. religious and aesthetic truth) pertains to the attitude where focus lies in finding 
existential fulfilment by extracting significance from the conceptual aspect of an artwork or 
religion. 
 
6.3.1.1 Conceptualisation: The difference between theme, subject, 
story and plot 
 
All artworks are about something and demand interpretation.71 Using terminology from the 
world of literature to describe all fields of art, any narrative is, first and foremost, made up of a 
plot and a story. These are more meticulous and finical in their aboutness than are subjects and 
themes. In literature, a plot is the work‟s events as arranged by the author, while the story is the 
plot rearranged in chronological order.72 The subject or subjects of a narrative refers to specific 
issues or topics, like love or death, while a theme is what the artwork has to say about the subject. 
While a story and a plot are dependent on the artwork itself, a theme states something generally 
about the reality outside the work from the conditions stated concretely in the text.73 
To draw parallels to religion, subjects in art are what I will connect to the 
inevitabilities of life, while themes in art are the truths of religion. In art, themes are what can be 
true or false with regards to the inevitabilities of the generalised human soul. (I will use „theme‟ 
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and „concept‟ interchangeably because „concept‟ applies better to the “theme” of a religion and 
does not interfere with the different meaning of „theme‟ in music.) 
The difference between on the one hand plot and story and on the other hand 
subject and theme can be exemplified by how hardly every reader will have experienced in their 
lives something as explicit and particular as e.g. the life of the medieval Danish royal court as 
recounted in Hamlet, but most people will sometime and to some degree during their life have 
experienced the feeling of existential dread identified in Shakespeare‟s play. Thus artists comment 
on the universal through the particular, making the understanding of “what is going on” (story) an 
important key to understanding which universal subject the artwork is dealing with. 
Hence we may find that a more or less true concept found in the contents of a 
work of art can be complex if we focus on plot, but also something as simple as the theme “life is 
hard”. For example, to pianist Mitsuko Uchida, Mozart‟s music is conceptually simple: 
 
Mozart is special for the whole of humanity because it is not about grand ideas or 
great concepts, it is about “I love you”, “you may love me”, “I am sad”, “you are 
so happy”. It sounds simplistic but at the core of it he is like Shakespeare: he uses 
the simplest means to elevate us into a universal world of absolute joy and 
sorrow.74 
 
So according to this view, artworks need not be conceptually complex to be meaningful to 
people; Uchida‟s description of Mozart‟s music even appears to touch upon the “merely 
emotional” or mysterious. But we should note how even she formulates the music as being about 
something – it is about these feelings of love, happiness and sadness. As long as there is a 
concept and we can grasp it intellectually – which is something we can do even with a concept as 
simple as “I am sad” – we are still dealing with an “aboutness” of sorts. 
Another example: we can imagine that when Beethoven sat down to compose the 
“Pathétique” piano sonata, he did not have a story in mind when scribbling down notes,  even 
though as an audience it is tempting for us to apply one such story to the music when listening to 
the sonata in question. Now, it is not an overly easy piece to accompany with a complete 
narrative due to its emotional complexity even though it does seem to have a narrative structure. 
Trying to tie to the “Pathétique” to an intricate story like, “Janet was on her way to the bakery, 
she was angry, she met with a friend on the way, they had a chat, a bird was singing gaily, 
someone shot the bird, Janet was distraught, bought three loaves of bread for £6.20”, is plausibly 
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too explicit and precise and would be of no help in our endeavour to hunt down the existential 
truth of the piece. It would be more rewarding to content oneself with the composition being a 
complex description of a certain mood, perhaps as an expression of a certain experience in the life 
of Beethoven. So we have rejected story as an adequate conceptualisation of the truth of the 
“Pathétique” and are instead content with a theme, which means that even though we have made 
its aboutness less explicit, it is nevertheless about something.  
According to Claude Debussy, Beethoven‟s famous Ninth Symphony has provoked 
a “mass of prose” since its premiere. He questions, however, whether clearing up the mystery of 
said symphony is worthwhile: “Perhaps we ought in the Choral Symphony to look for nothing more 
than a magnificent gesture of musical pride.”75 Even here, trying to avoid explicit meaning, 
Debussy manages to provide a helpful concept. Listening to the Ninth with the assumption that 
what we hear is an expression of a man‟s pride in his art helps us adjust our minds to the 
(possible) logic of the piece. Terry Barrett quotes dance critic Marcia Siegel, who also finds that it 
helps to put into words the experience in order to understand its logic: 
 
Very often it turns out that as I write about something, it gets better. It‟s not that 
I‟m so enthusiastic that I make it better, but that in writing, because the words are 
an instrument of thinking, I can often get deeper into a choreographer‟s thoughts 
or processes and see more logic, more reason.76 
 
As long as the composition describes something (e.g. a mood), we can conceptualise it and that 
concept can be a more or less true concept both by how accurately it fits with the structure of the 
music and by how accurately it fits with human experience in general. Although the applying of a 
specific story with intricate scenes or applying a more general theme or even applying a single 
emotion to the piece are all important steppingstones on the road towards extracting meaning 
from an artwork because all are part of human experience, themes seem to be the most 
significant. This is because they are not only more universal than other concepts, but also because 
they hit our hearts more deeply than do less universal and fundamental themes or plots. Our 
feelings with regards to love, for example, may be common and hardly complex in themselves, 
but are therefore also some of the most hard-hitting and important of any human emotions, and 
I believe it reasonable to believe that hard-hitting and important truths are the most likely to 
provide us with the most existential meaning. 
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So this is how the Truth approach towards art works: 
 
1. We figure out what an artwork wants to say – and this interpretation can be more or 
less true (i.e. more or less accurate). 
2. We apply this interpretation to our experience, our generalised human soul – and this 
correspondence can, in turn, also ring more or less true to us. 
3. If we make an accurate interpretation of an artwork, and this interpretation happens 
to correspond accurately to our experience, then we gain existential meaning. 
 
If we, instead, pay attention only to an immediate emotion evoked by a solemn piece of music 
without applying a concept to it, we cannot, in turn, apply the concept to our lives as wholes, and 
that – in the Truth approach point of view – turns art into mere decoration, unable to provide us 
with much meaning. 
 Thus plot is a complex but superficial guide or metaphor which points to the 
underlying simple but deep and universal theme. We may transfer these relationships from the 
realm of art to that of religion by saying that the scriptures, symbols, dances and rituals of religion 
are all a complex potpourri pointing to an underlying simple but deep and universal purpose in 
our lives. 
 
6.3.1.2 Is there something even more comprehensive than themes? 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer glorifies the Platonic Idea (or the “Will” in Schopenhauerian terms) as the 
main purpose of art. To Schopenhauer, the value of art lies not in its figurative aspect, i.e. its 
references to the real world – a nude study, a landscape painting and the like. A painting of a 
human face should not, in Schopenhauer‟s view, be a mere portrait, a copy of the individual 
including its contingencies. Instead, even in the painter‟s reproduction of an individual human 
being‟s character, that character serves only to represent one component of the general human 
idea.77 Here, Schopenhauer‟s philosophy shows connections to the Truth approach in the sense 
that the Truth approach strives to venture beyond historicity (though never without first 
journeying across these two) and focus on the theme which is more directly connected to the 
inevitabilities of the generalised human soul. But to Schopenhauer, the inner meaning of an 
artwork is even more general: the inner meaning is not a plot nor is it even a theme, but 
something beyond both. The ideas sought by Schopenhauer are, namely, ideas in a Platonic 
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sense; they are not rational concepts and cannot in any way be dependent upon historicity.78 One 
notices this attitude in Schopenhauer‟s disregard for conceptual art. His criticism of conceptual 
art seems grounded in a concern for its lack of eternality: after a few years, concepts will have 
changed since they are dependent on the spirit of the times. The major difference between 
concepts and Schopenhauerian Ideas, consists, in Schopenhauer‟s view, in how a concept is 
abstract and can be communicated through words without further mediation, while the Idea is a 
representation of a multitude of individual entities.79 Therefore, the simpler the Idea itself is or 
the more universal it is, the more complex a reality it covers. This makes sense in the way that a 
universal category, e.g. the category of all things in the universe, encompasses a multitude of 
individual entities, while a specific category, e.g. the category of all Malayan tigers that bit their 
tails today three years ago, by comparison incorporates little of the universe as we know it. In 
Schopenhauer‟s view then, a concept is too specific to fully grasp the complexity of an artwork. 
This in turn suggests that an artwork truly is a world of multiple entities which point to a more 
fundamental category, and the deeper we reach as interpreters (from plot to theme to Idea) the 
more of those entities are included in a single abstract frame. Ideas, then, summarise more 
aspects of an artwork than do concepts. 
This suggests that concepts in the Schopenhauerian use of the term are entirely 
contingent and in no way near the eternality of Platonic ideas; it suggests that concepts are not 
universal enough. But how universal does a concept need to be? Is Schopenhauer perhaps too 
strict? Let us ponder an artwork that depicts one of the human inevitabilities: shame. Shame is 
not an idea in the Platonic sense because shame is a concept which can be grasped rationally. 
And yet it is not a “lowly” concept in the critical Schopenhauerian sense either. Shame does not 
represent the Will, but neither is it wholly contingent; shame is not dependent on the spirit of the 
times, but is rather a reoccurring subject in the lives of humans. Shame is not universal in the 
sense that it would continue being a concept worth keeping after the entire human species has 
died out – shame is a necessarily human concept coined by creatures with these feelings and the 
cognitive ability to make linguistic references to it (though who knows what other high-
intelligence beings may be out there or are yet to develop). But since art concerns only human 
beings, why do concepts need to concern something allegedly beyond the “merely human” in an 
epistemological sense? The merely human influences everything we do, say and feel. While 
nothing hinders art from being about the mystery of the cosmos or the difficulty of expressing 
what seems ineffable, art appeals to us not because it provides answers about the unutterable 
itself, but because it provides answers about human experience of what seems unutterable. The 
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Schopenhauerian demand for ideas that are so universal that they are relevant to things beyond 
what is humanly possible to fathom – and therefore, it seems, ultimately irrelevant to human 
beings – is unnecessarily high. Schopenhauer could be said to aim for a truth so high that it lands 
on the other side of comprehensibility, a truth which is only of interest to a restricted, mystery-
oriented epistemology on the opposite “side” of a conceptualised world. The need for 
universality is understandable, but we cannot refer to things wholly beyond human experience, 
and thematic concepts appear to be as universal as human experience goes. Why we cannot refer 
to things beyond human experience will be discussed in a summary of Hilary Putnam‟s criticism 
of objectivity in the following chapter. 
If we transfer these conclusions to a religious context, we may say that what is truly 
humanly relevant to us in religious practice is everything as specific as religious truth concerning 
the correct way of breathing during meditation, as universal as religious truth concerning the 
inevitabilities of life, and everything in-between, where religious truth concerning the 
inevitabilities of life constitutes the apex of existential satisfaction as provided by religion. 
 
6.3.2 The generalised human soul as anchor for objectivity in the 
arts 
 
A generalised human soul is, I believe, what we have to refer to whenever we wish to make a 
general claim whether an artwork provides existential truth or not. The question “Does x do y?” 
in the natural sciences corresponds do the art critic‟s question “Does this artwork contain 
existential truth?”. The scientific question is answered by having a theory, e.g. the theory of 
relativity, tested against the physical world‟s ontological limitations (cf. Chapter 5), in this case 
from our observations of the planets. The art critic‟s question is answered by having the theme 
(the “theory”) of the artwork, e.g. “time heals all wounds”, tested against the generalised human 
soul‟s limitations, in this case from our observations of the subject of emotional pain over time 
(cf. Herrmann‟s comparison in Chapter 4.5.1). In the same way as we put faith into how our 
pastors or psychiatrists have an authoritative knowledge when it comes to our souls and how they 
offer a path of “redemption”, we appoint art critics based on their experience not only in art 
history, art theory and so on, but also on their experience of emotional encounters in their own 
lives and their understanding of how the human soul functions and what it craves. 
In this case, trying to anchor truth objectively to a generalised human soul, which is 
an “inside world” as opposed to an “outside” material world, may seem contradictory. But the 
generalised human soul is not to be confused with the “internal” referent. The generalised human 
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soul is an internal world referred to as an external object, i.e. a collective human soul referred to 
by many souls. Therefore, the generalised human soul must be viewed as, and criticised as, a part 
of the external (although perhaps not “material”) world. 
But how do we refer to objects external to our souls? Can we refer to something as 
true or false objectively? To assume an entirely external perspective in our description of reality 
would imply that we would be able to refer to things we have not yet conceptualised.80 This is 
made impossible by the fact that what our words refer to is decided by the linguistic community 
of which we are a part – the connection between a word and what it refers to is not dependent 
upon things like what the individual is thinking about when he or she says e.g. “water”. 81 „Water‟ 
may as well refer to what we call daffodils, but now linguistic development in the English 
language has it that „water‟ refers to water, not daffodils. So in order to communicate at all, we 
first have to reach an agreement on what we refer to. 
 However, what is true or false is not dependent upon our conceptions in 
themselves. The fact that Caesar crossed the river Rubicon is not dependent upon us and our 
conceptions. He either did or did not cross the Rubicon independently of whether there are any 
human beings (or other creatures) able to state that fact after it happened. But the statement 
“Julius Caesar crossed the river Rubicon” cannot be formulated without our conceptions, and 
speaking about things that cannot be formulated is pointless.82 Now, is objectivity impossible 
simply because we cannot presuppose an unconceptualised reality (noumena)? No. Rather, 
disallowing an unconceptualised reality helps us on the way towards objectivity. Because if we 
assume an entirely external perspective, that assumption would lead to ontological relativity 
because we would believe we would be able to speak of something independent of how we divide 
the world.83 We simply would not know what we were talking about. If one assumes that one can 
refer to things in an unconceptualised reality, this assumption would open up for a world where a 
„newspaper‟ to one person may as well be a „submarine‟ to someone else. 
The foundation of objectivity is, rather, what a community believes constitutes 
sufficient epistemic conditions to be able to assert that something is true (or false);84 hence 
objectivity has to do with what we are able to imagine.85 Independently of whether or not we can 
prove the existence of planet x (perhaps it is too far away), the statement, “Planet x exists”, is at 
least a meaningful statement since we can imagine what it would signify that it is true that planet x 
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exists. Sufficient epistemic conditions for being able to say that the statement, “Planet x exists”, 
could be the ability for our telescopes to see far enough. This condition (i.e. possessing these 
telescopes or the like) is easy to imagine, hence we can imagine what it would like for the 
statement to be true, which in turn means that the statement is meaningful. We cannot, however, 
even imagine which conditions are needed in order to justify the existence of noumena; hence 
speaking of the existence of noumena is meaningless.86 Because if one does not know exactly 
what one refers to, how can we prove its existence? “Does „f4%@‟ exist?” one may ask. We 
would not know where to start, because we would not know what it would mean for „f4%@‟ to 
exist, because one could be referring to anything, whether concrete or abstract. Thus objectivity 
is not dependent upon epistemic access of the things in themselves, but upon epistemic access to 
one‟s linguistic community‟s conceptualisation of the world and what that community deems 
sufficient conditions to call something true or false. 
Before discussing the connection between proper references and art the 
terminology which is used should be justified. When speaking of the truthfulness of something as 
existentially charged as an artwork, we are dealing with what I call the generalised human soul as 
interpreted and expressed by the artwork. This concept („generalised human soul‟) is “new”, i.e. 
first introduced in this essay, which is why this essay will have to serve as the linguistic 
community which decides what „generalised human soul‟ means. However, said concept is, I 
believe, a precision of what people for a long time have simply called „the soul‟ or „the spirit‟ or 
„the human psyche‟ or „human experience‟. Our knowledge of the generalised human soul is then 
gathered by what has been said about the soul, the spirit, the human psyche and human 
experience in the works still available to us to this day by any and all artists and philosophers 
throughout a certain culture. Whenever “the soul” is written about or in other ways expressed in 
paintings, symphonies or cathedrals, it is reasonable to believe that what is referred to is not 
merely the isolated, individual psyche of the artist himself, but an expression of our joint human 
journey in life, where the artist through his or her artwork tries to reach out to fellow human 
beings to ask, “This is what it is like for us all, is it not? Is this not exactly what we all experience? 
Is this not truth?” So, what Shakespeare, Beethoven and others contribute to humanity is 
sculpting one facet of the larger knowledge about and (perhaps) insight into what it is to be 
human. Thus we have decided, at least to some degree, what we refer to when we speak the 
generalised human soul, or its many synonyms and its many expressions. Thus the generalised 
human soul is – because it is fixed by our linguistic community – not ontologically relative and I 
deem its use justified. 
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Now, what does conceptualisation of the material world (discussing the existence 
of “Planet x” and so forth) have to do with human existential experience? The answer is that the 
generalised human soul corresponds to the physical world in the sense that we can conceptualise 
our inner world as well. Existential inevitabilities are concepts resulting from dividing our soul 
into several experiences and emotions. We can talk about and refer to things like „love‟ and „pain‟ 
because most human beings know what we mean when uttering these words. If we can refer to 
something like „pain‟, then we can fairly easily imagine ways to figure out whether or not life is 
difficult (in order to justify the truth of that statement, “Life is hard”), because hardship and pain 
are easily identifiable in our inner life. Life‟s hardship is then not something as impossibly elusive 
as noumena. So, the world in which we find these experiences, the world which we divide into 
concepts such as „pain‟ and „love‟, is human experience, the generalised human soul. 
These concepts must also be recognisable in an artwork. We may all know what 
love is, because we know our own psyches: we have a specific emotion and in communication 
with other people we come to an agreement that we should call this emotion „love‟. We recognise 
it as the same feeling inter-subjectively because our descriptions of the feeling correspond with 
that of others, the causal relation is almost always the same (boy meets girl, pleasant feelings 
ensue) and so on. Recognition of love in a piece of art is slightly less precise, but nevertheless far 
from impossible. In the same sense as “Planet x” may be recognised by certain criteria – 
atmosphere, orbital and physical characteristics – if we make out criteria for what love is as 
recognised within ourselves – feelings of strong attraction, personal attachment, unselfish 
concern, “butterflies in the stomach”, despair at its being unrequited – finding these in art should 
not be impossible. An expression of love is found in Goethe‟s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers where 
unrequited love is likened to a physical sickness leading to madness, but love may also be found 
as concept in many a Mozartian sonata. 
Thus if objectivity about the material world is founded in epistemic access to one‟s 
linguistic community‟s conceptualisation of the world and what that community deems sufficient 
conditions to call something true or false, and the generalised human soul as well as an artwork 
are equally divided into concepts and we are able to imagine sufficient conditions for the truth in 
these concepts, then objectivity in art is also possible. 
Objectivity in art is in this case not about whether an artwork is objectively good or 
bad – that is a slightly different discussion and something which, I believe, applies to both the 
Mystery and Truth approach – but whether we can speak meaningfully about the things that the 
Truth approach refers to when discussing what an artwork is about. In accordance with the 
above discussion it indeed seems that we can, which is justified from an existential perspective 
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because this aboutness corresponds to our inner landscapes, whose conceptualised world we can 
speak meaningfully of as well. As opposed to Cartesian objectivity – where we assume we can 
make meaningful statements about elevated things when it is merely nonsense – this objectivity is 
not unjustified and is therefore not – as can perhaps be apprehended – pretentious. Thus because 
truth more firmly connects our soul – which seeks meaning – to the aesthetic meaning it seeks, 
the Truth approach is further justified as an approach when seeking existential meaning in art. 
The conclusive implication of existential truth is then whether or not it connects 
our emotions with art and religion. Another way of saying it is that an artwork or religion 
becomes emotionally true to us once we, via the Truth approach, have made that connection. 
Emotional/existential falsity would then be the condition when there is no connection between 
the aesthetic or religious expression on the one hand and our experiences and emotional 
reactions to life‟s inevitabilities on the other hand. 
 
6.3.2.1 Is objectivity justified by the artist’s intentions? 
 
Objectivity has not only to do with whether we as perceivers of an artwork can speak 
meaningfully about its contents. It has also to do with whether the artist can meaningfully 
communicate with his audience to such a degree that we as perceivers may understand the 
artwork. Because if communication of existential truth was made impossible, the Truth approach 
would be pointless. Now, if truth and objectivity are opposed to ambiguity, and we presuppose 
Hedenius‟ logical postulate saying that two truths cannot contradict each other (they either do 
not contradict each other or one of the “truths” is false),87 there must also be something like an 
unambiguous (non-contradictory) truth to be found in an artwork and many 
interpretations/concepts of it that are contradictory. This, in turn, means that interpretations (and 
not only the themes in themselves as tested against our psychological needs) can be more or less 
true. 
There are many wildly different themes or stories which one can apply to a single 
artwork, a circumstance that in itself can be interpreted as an argument against the idea that art 
can or should be about anything. The argument could look something like this if we apply it to 
music: If there are multiple themes (NB: not „theme‟ of common musical terminology where it is 
defined as a fundamental recurring melody of a composition) that could fruitfully be applied to a 
piece of music – i.e. there are no major conflicts between the details of the theme we apply and 
what each change in the music makes us feel – then there simply cannot be a single “correct” 
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theme, and therefore the act of applying themes or stories to music at all is futile. Why, however, 
should that conclusion follow from those premises? The act of applying themes is not futile only 
because there happens to be more than one theme that more or less “fits” the music in question. 
The opposite condition would entail that interpretation is entirely arbitrary, which would mean 
that an absurd interpretation like “Hesse‟s Siddhartha is about academic conceit”, when its theme 
rather seems to concern the dichotomy of worldliness and piety. We do not have to argue in 
absolutist terms: although “one correct interpretation” may indeed be an ideal to strive for and 
although such a truth may be impossible to achieve in reality, striving to be more right than wrong 
would nevertheless be better according to the Truth approach than not trying to apply a theme at 
all. There are simply some themes that fit better to an artwork than do others, even if the better 
ones are not a perfect fit. Terry Barrett suggests that “no single meaning is exhaustive of the 
meaning of an artwork”, but “some interpretations are better than others”.88 
Trying to find a fit, does it matter what the artist himself or herself had in mind? 
On an unusually programmatic whim, Beethoven famously annotated each movement of his 
Sixth Symphony (“Pastorale”) accordingly: 
 
1. Awakening of cheerful feelings upon arrival in the country 
2. Scene at the brook 
3. Happy gathering of country folk 
4. Thunderstorm; Storm 
5. Shepherd‟s song; cheerful and thankful feelings after the storm89 
 
It is indeed easy to imagine the “happy gathering of country folk” in the third movement, the 
thunderstorm in the fourth movement and so on. However, we would miss out on much of the 
symphony‟s potential existential meaning should we only look to the plot provided by the 
composer. According to the Truth approach the truth of an artwork is found in its theme, while 
the plot either guides us or contains metaphors and symbols to underline the theme in question. 
Thus if an artwork should be evaluated by assessing its underlying theme, the listener should not 
let the annotations of Beethoven‟s Sixth be quintessential to his or her understanding of the 
piece, though, as said, these annotation could work as a guide towards how the symphony 
corresponds to our emotions concerning the inevitabilities of life. Indeed, although music has an 
ability to mimic the sounds of nature, one may as well argue for how music mimics the sounds of 
people‟s voices and the intention heard in them through intonation and so on. Therefore there 
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seems to be more potential communication and intention embedded in music than what we can 
assume from mere annotations. Ultimately, in Terry Barrett‟s words, “the objects of 
interpretations are artworks, not artists”.90 
 How this additional aboutness – which goes beyond plot and constitutes a whole 
theme – is created in the artist is indeed mysterious. Not only do artworks often appear 
mysterious (and therefore meaningful) to the beholder, but to the artist responsible for the 
artwork as well. And the artist sometimes intentionally works in mysterious ways, i.e. he waits for 
sensuous images or melodies to pop up in his head “automatically”, without reflection upon what 
they mean. This was the case with David Lynch‟s making of his 1997 feature film Lost Highway: 
 
On Lost Highway we never talked about meanings or anything [...] If things get too 
specific, the dream stops. There are things that happen sometimes that open up a 
door and let you soar out and feel a bigger thing.91 
 
To Lynch, these feelings have to come without mental obstacles or cookie-cutter shapes: 
 
If you start off with a theme and say, „We‟re gonna amplify this theme,‟ [...] that to 
me is completely backwards. Then you‟ve gotta force things to fit.92 
 
Working this way, the artist is almost as clueless as his audience. This seems to imply that the 
artist does not intend for his art to be about anything and that the artwork therefore becomes 
meaningful to us as an audience only if we apply the Mystery approach, and that the artwork 
becomes meaningless if we apply the Truth approach. But Lynch has more input which may 
suggest otherwise: 
 
The other way around [i.e. letting images come to you before any 
conceptualisations], you don‟t know what it is. It just comes together and then later 
you find out. But meanwhile you‟re falling in love with it. You just know 
somewhere that it‟s right for you.93 
 
This proposes that which ideas the artist chooses to keep in the artwork and which ideas he 
chooses to abandon originate not intellectually but instinctively. To some degree, then, the artist 
and his audience alike are interpreters of the artist‟s ideas only after those ideas have been 
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created. But does that mean that the artist does not have anything to communicate at the outset? 
I propose that because, as Lynch hints, “you just know [my emphasis] somewhere that it‟s right 
for you”, instinctive ideas of this kind do have meaning for the artist at the outset, but have not 
yet been conceptualised in a fully conscious way. Artist and audience alike can sense a hint of 
what it means and recognise some of its power without grasping its entire aboutness – in Lynch‟s 
words it “just comes together”. It just comes together, and yet we have not fully identified its 
significance, because, as Lynch says, “then later you find out”. If we agree with Lynch, any 
ontological limitations have to be shattered in order for the artist to create freely and find the 
instinctively powerful images and sounds that will constitute his work. The artwork‟s ontology 
may then be demarcated by the artist in order to more easily relate the artwork to human 
experience. 
So, it appears that to some degree the ideas and meaning of an artwork are always 
decided upon by the artist, even if it is not brought about through what we usually refer to as 
“intention” and although the artist himself may refuse or fail to ever conceptualise the artwork 
(i.e. tell us in words what it is about). After all, that would perhaps not be the mission of an artist, 
but that of a critic. More importantly, objectivity still seems possible because even among 
mystery-seeking artists there seems to be an intention, a message, a truth to be found; hence we 
can still speak meaningfully of the artist‟s thematic creation. 
 
6.3.3 The difficulty of applying a non-conceptual perspective and 
how truth saves us from despair through “navigation” 
 
Schopenhauer had a viable point: art should be more than mere concepts. And it is. But 
Schopenhauer‟s rather extreme view points to a problem where it is difficult not to apply concepts 
to experiences of art. We seem to be afraid to lose the magic of our own experience of the art we 
perceive if we know what it is about, in turn making us assume that the unconscious creativity of 
the artist and the equally unconscious appreciation of the spectator are supposedly the things that 
make art meaningful. But from the Truth approach point of view, this is a misunderstanding. The 
reason why we appreciate art at all is that we do have a slight idea what the art is about; we have at 
least a slight hint of a concept. Even when trying to produce a pure aesthetic form (as in e.g. 
absolute music), there is always at least an indirect reference: the art work is perceived as joyful or 
sad.94 
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One example of our predilection for conceptualising artworks even when we 
intend not to, is Hoffmann‟s review of Beethoven‟s Fifth Symphony. In it, Hoffmann clearly 
wishes to advocate the symphony as a prime example of non-descriptive music insofar as its 
subject is the infinite, indefinite, inexpressible and immeasurable – a “ghostly world”.95 The 
review illustrates Hoffmann‟s wish to celebrate the Romantic spirit by exalting Beethoven‟s work 
to a near-transcendent realm as a way of saying that no words can truly describe its profundity. 
This is an understandable approach, but the review as a whole shows the difficulty of being 
consistently non-conceptual. Because Hoffmann cannot help but be specific enough to mention 
how the music “wields the lever of fear, awe, horror, and pain” and goes on to formulate 
something which is close to a full-blown conceptualisation of the work: 
 
The breast that is oppressed and alarmed by intimations of things monstrous, 
destructive, and threatening wheezes for air with wrenching gasps, but just then 
a friendly, luminous figure appears and brings light into the dark night […]96 
 
Although Hoffmann bravely keeps the description relatively abstract, mysterious and 
otherworldly, the effort appears contrived and practically screams out for more concrete 
descriptions to guide his assessment. Thus the review I think exemplifies a general human need 
for conceptualisation. 
Does this suggestion demand that “essence precedes existence”? Only when it 
comes to our nature itself, not the contents provided by the Truth approach, i.e. the act is natural 
while the concept itself is never given beforehand. We may have a natural inclination to 
conceptualise, and the inevitabilities of the generalised human soul – which the Truth approach 
presupposes – are also innate and therefore essential to the human condition. But the content, 
the what of the Truth approach, is not a foregone conclusion. To follow a scientific impulse to 
find out what is true is, rather, necessarily a flexible approach which needs to be prepared for 
unexpected answers. One might suggest that if we cannot “help ourselves” from naming things, 
we tamper with a natural impulse, and that the Truth approach seems more meaningful than the 
Mystery approach because following natural impulses is more meaningful than not doing so. 
While tempting, following that conclusion leads to a possible fallacy (an “appeal to nature”) 
which, should it be challenged, would need an essay of its own. 
The point here is, instead, that if we cannot escape conceptualisation, we may as 
well try to make the concepts we use more accurate. Because if we try to stay away from concepts 
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while we nevertheless do conceptualise artworks when we try to describe them, the description 
becomes distorted. It may be argued that this is irrelevant to anyone who is only interested in the 
mysterious side of art – what does truth matter to them? The answer is that truth will matter even 
to them as soon as they refer to things, because if we try to keep mystery intact when in fact we 
already start to conceptualise as soon as we start talking about an artwork and have thus entered 
the “realm” of truth, we enter it as ignoramuses. Trying to make sense of one‟s experience (which 
we undoubtedly do if we have started to refer to things) clashes with the Mystery approach 
endeavour to keep intellectual sense out of the picture. This keeps us on from knowing more 
when in a context where only knowledge is satisfactory. Thus we are struck with existential 
frustration from the feeling that one is not in a land of meaningful mystery, but stuck in one of 
ignorance. In other words, if not even seekers of mystery can avoid some truth, the Mystery 
approach will inevitably clash with the Truth approach, leading to ignorance rather than mystery, 
and thus existential frustration from lack of meaning. Hoffmann, in his review above, comes off 
as ignorant and even pretentious with his “infinite, indefinite, inexpressible and immeasurable” 
Beethoven, while he appears more honest and true to himself when he paints analogies of “things 
monstrous” and “friendly, luminous figures”. 
Kierkegaard finds similar problems in the immediacy of mystery. According to him, 
the human being is a synthesis between two terms: the temporal and the eternal. Because human 
beings constitute a synthesis, this makes possible an imbalance, a sickness of the self, which 
Kierkegaard identifies as despair.97 One way of being in despair is brought about in people who are 
in immediate continuity with something illusorily (the temporal) thought to be eternal. The 
person in despair makes himself dependent upon things external – if external circumstances 
change, then so does he. Because reflection is something internal, the self passively craves and 
desires without reflection.98 This immediacy entails an extreme fragility: should a small amount of 
reflection enter into this state of immediacy, the person becomes aware of the difficulties 
inherent in the imperfect self, and thus recoils from it and despairs. Symptomatically, he ends up 
in reveries, wishing to be someone else. Yet the despairer is unable to properly point this despair 
out. This is an intermediate state in which no definite step is taken towards inward awareness – it 
is the imbalance between the temporal and eternal. In Kierkegaard‟s view, it is the most common 
form of despair, shown in adolescents in the form of the illusion of hope in the extraordinary 
from life and themselves, and in adults in the illusion of recollection, i.e. exaggerated positive 
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accounts of their own youth.99 It seems that a person who always looks to the external features of 
art is therefore existentially fragile to the “eternal” character of a truth, i.e. what the artwork is 
about. Questions of what an artwork is about will inevitably turn up much in the same way that 
we sooner or later will ask what life is about. And we will be unable to answer those questions 
because immediacy of mystery is not equipped to answer them. 
 What we can learn from Kierkegaard‟s critique is that the Truth approach could 
make us “immune” to the despair brought about by difficult questions because the Truth 
approach allows us to navigate our inner landscape. The Mystery approach is not interested in 
concepts or dividing the world (inner or outer) into things we can refer to, hence the Mystery 
approach leaves us lost once the questions that demand navigation even start to pop up at the 
back of the heads of mystery-seekers. In this view, the Mystery approach is simply not an 
existentially sustainable approach to art, religion or life in general. Everyone may not find a fully 
satisfying answer through the Truth approach, but seems a better option when considering the 
sudden despair that may be brought about by the Mystery approach. 
Yet another aspect added to the temporal/eternal dichotomy is that of complexity: 
the idea that a work of art should not be interpreted at all in order to preserve its mystery could 
originate in the assumption that complexity of an artistic expression is something that is good in 
itself and that a conceptualisation of the same artwork merely simplifies its expression, i.e. the 
complexity is decreased. I will argue that complexity can be seen as something existentially 
valuable. 
 Here, the term „complexity‟ is assumed to be connected to (and relevant to) 
existential meaning and that existential complexity is something opposed to what could be called 
“material” complexity. In other words, the complexity of the existential expression in e.g. a 
symphony is what is important to this discussion, not necessarily the complexity of the 
composition itself or the technicality of the playing performed by the orchestra. Existential 
complexity has to do with complexity of human emotions rather than any complexity rendered 
outside of our psyche. 
 How then could this emotional complexity be valuable in an artwork? The short 
answer is that an emotionally complex work of art captures a wider range of emotions and more 
nuances associated with human life, hence it provides a more complete answer to the question of 
what it is to be human. The amount of emotional complexity in a work of art could therefore be 
said to be relevant to the amount of existential meaning which said artwork creates, because we 
must indeed ask ourselves, “How relevant is this work of art to my life? How relevant is it to the 
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experiences I have had in life and what can it teach me about the experiences which are yet to 
come?” 
 But is emotional complexity a reality? Is it not a mere nonsense term for something 
which cannot be referred to because it is not fully distinguishable in art? How can we label one 
artwork more emotionally complex and another one less so? It does not have to be difficult. To 
illustrate with an example, let us consider the art of music and regard the possible differences in 
existential complexity (and thus relevance to human experience) between different pieces of 
music. If we rank the pieces, the least existentially complex music would be the kind that merely 
keeps rhythm. A piece which keeps rhythm could still be called music and its keeping rhythm has 
some value to a human being (one can stomp one‟s feet to the rhythm for entertainment 
purposes or, as in ancient times, have slaves in a Roman galley row its heavy oars to the beat of a 
drum for more utilitarian reasons), but other than that this kind of music provides little of 
existential value. Further up the hierarchy, we find music which is at least catchy. It piques our 
interest somewhat, but does not bring out any emotion. The next item, a level above the last, 
does exactly that: it brings out an emotion in the listener. This single emotion can be anything 
from joy to anger, from love to hate, but is nevertheless only a single emotion played about in a 
recurrent pattern. The next few levels of emotional complexity convey a larger number of 
emotions and eventually convey emotional change. Emotional change is, I believe, of importance 
to existential meaning because emotional change mirrors perhaps the largest existential problem 
to human beings. Had we been continuously content without any change in feelings about our 
circumstances, had we not had the experience that joy might easily turn into sadness, or hope 
into disappointment, the “therapeutic” aspect of art would hardly be needed in the first place (cf. 
Chapter 3 on coping). On a higher level, music may convey a specific experience, meaning that 
the music has a specific story to tell: through e.g. thematic development music may create a 
subjectively perceived narrative that is more than merely a few haphazard emotions without 
direction. Presumably even more relevant to existential meaning is a conveyed experience which 
involves a feeling of having learned something about life, and even further up the ladder we find 
a more generalised maturation experience. What I have been meaning to show is that it is 
possible (at least in theory) to produce art that uses simple emotional building blocks that by 
increasing complexity manages to mirror the more profound experiences of human life. If this is 
true, it is possible for artworks to – by virtue of being more or less complex – be more or less 
meaningful. 
 Now, it could be said that conceptualisations “cheapen” the artistic expression by 
simplifying it. The “quasi-experience” provided by an artwork (as discussed later on, in Chapter 
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6.3.4) loses, it could be argued, its nuances if translated into a more intellectual and “dry” 
concept. If complexity is valuable to existential meaning, it is reasonable to assume that anything 
which decreases complexity (e.g. conceptualisation) would also decrease the potential existential 
meaning contained in a work of art. Because is it not the case that a conceptualisation of an 
artwork like “Life is hard” indeed cheapens the artwork by simplifying it and brushing aside its 
nuances? How can the music of Mozart be any good if we accept Uchida‟s view (cf. 6.3.1.1) and 
reduce it to simple concepts like “I am sad”? While it may be true that – as discussed concerning 
Schopenhauer‟s Ideas in 6.3.1.2 – the simpler (and hence the more universal) the 
idea/theme/plot itself is the more complex a reality it covers, the “covering” (i.e. the summary) 
of a complex reality is only covering in the sense that the concept describes that reality. The 
category of all things of the known universe only describes its contents in the sense that the 
category in question gives us only a rough knowledge of what we may expect from it, what we 
may find there. It does not, however, provide the experience of all these things; the Mystery 
approach would, however, demand immediate, sensuous contact with each nuance of colour, 
form, sound and so forth. The problem with simple (and therefore more universal) concepts is 
that they are shortcuts, and with shortcuts we miss out on the experience of learning and 
maturation. The tramp Sandemar in Harry Martinson‟s novel Vägen till Klockrike describes this 
problem by contrasting – on the one hand – nature “as is” and our immediate, undisguised 
contact with it (“truth”), with – on the other hand – the words (“probabilities”) we use to 
disguise the horrors of the disrupted reality around us:100 
 
… the world is an infinite archipelago of improbabilities. And a tremendous 
struggle and kneading of the words is required in order to have them trusted with 
the in her banality entirely fortress-secure and arrogant human being of universal 
applicability, with her false reliability, the cold and emotionally dead.101 
  
Nor is this Sandemar impressed with the collective agreement upon reference 
mentioned in 6.3.2: he prefers the unvarnished reality to the “mendaciously sober gathering 
around symbols” that “cannot cover reality, but they can conceal both play and suffering”.102 As a 
response to this criticism I wish to emphasise that the point of concepts is not to liken the 
immediate experience of the world, nor is it to conceal it (although that is one of its possible 
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applications), nor is it to perpetually keep us away from the immediate world. Concepts are 
merely there to guide our minds and make order in the jungle that is the chaos of nature, and 
then have us return there all the wiser. In the musical case, complexity is not necessarily reduced 
because we let a theme guide us; rather, themes help us structure what we experience into a 
coherent whole. The assembly instructions to an IKEA shelf are not the same as the finished 
shelf itself, but had we no manual, we might still sit among a disarray of planks and screws (neat 
though they may be). For this reason I think Mozart can be complex as well; whether the concept 
we use is complex or not, it helps us appreciate the complexity of Mozart with more precision. 
Uchida‟s concept “I am sad” is more precise than the immediacy of mystery, yet is not very 
precise, and nevertheless it provides some accuracy, some aim, to the listener who tackles 
Mozart‟s intricate composition. 
Martinson makes a fair argument – concepts create a kind of “distance” from 
unruly nature – but intellectual knowledge is nevertheless important because even if we believe 
that we retain the complexity of an artwork by choosing not to conceptualise it and thus believe 
that we gain a more genuine aesthetic experience, if we do not know what we experience, the 
experience of said complexity will be perceived merely as a chaotic jumble, which – if we follow 
Kierkegaard‟s argument – leads to despair. Again, we need navigation. Perhaps the disorder 
perceived is confused with complexity itself, which in turn – according to Mystery-seekers – was 
supposed to provide meaning, beauty and experience. 
This problem relates to the ontological relativity described in Chapter 6.3.2. With 
the ontological chaos inevitably prompted by the Mystery approach preference for disorder, it is 
hard to find a justifiable way to be able to refer to anything that is of value to existential meaning. 
We cannot refer to any single emotions presented as symbols or metaphors in an artwork; we 
cannot refer to emotional change, specific experiences or experiences of learning or maturation 
mirrored in the work of art. Nor can any of these concepts be referred to in wholly religious 
contexts. With the use of intellectual conceptualisation, however, we have at our disposal a guide 
with which we may know something by dividing a work of art (and the world as a whole) into 
concepts which may then give us a clue as to what the work as whole wants to communicate. But 
if the experience of an artwork is ontologically relative, we cannot claim that we have had an 
experience of anything. Mystery-seekers may claim that we do not need to refer to anything, that 
we do not need an experience of anything and that ontological relativity is existentially “all right” 
because all we need is the experience itself. The Truth approach, however, has the ability to 
connect the emotions expressed in an artwork with the emotions of our psyche, because the Truth 
approach allows us to navigate both the artistic themes and our inner landscape. The Mystery 
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approach does not seem to be able to justify any such connection. It seems, rather, that it is a 
“hit-and-miss” approach: sometimes we happen to recognise something in the chaotic jumble 
that we have made from an artwork which resonates with our own soul and it feels mysteriously 
significant, but it is a rough method which misses and confuses at least as often as it hits and 
astonishes. (It is also possible that the accuracy of the Truth approach manages to hit the mark 
not only more often than the Mystery approach, but also more deeply: truth has the quantity and 
the quality of existential meaning.) So, referring to something (in this case the emotional building 
blocks of art) by means of concepts may indeed be seen as experiential “shortcuts”, but at least it 
effectively connects our souls to the artwork we experience because of the navigational power of 
conceptualisation. 
To apply these finds to religion, the difficulty in avoiding conceptualisation of art 
echoes the difficulty in avoiding conceptualising God even when do not wish to do so. If, for 
example, we want God to be infinitely profound, any name or concept given to God would take 
Him down to a lower level – lower, at least, than the level of infinity. Therefore, we call God that 
which is greater than anything that could possibly be fathomed by man, or we refer to Him as 
„Godhead‟ or the ground of being, an esoteric, mystical category or the like. We do so in order to 
avoid the diminishing power of words, but are stranded with 1) concepts nevertheless, and 2) 
concepts that are comparatively empty of meaning and relevance to us as human beings with 
human experiences and needs. The Judeo-Christian custom of referring to God as „Father‟ puts 
Him in a more relevant position to us than e.g. „Godhead‟ and is nonetheless powerful – „Father‟ 
is then the compromise between the ineffable and meaningless on the one hand and the 
authoritatively diminishing on the other. 
 But as hinted at above, there is a larger religious context, not only about God 
specifically. If religion and art both provide answers to what life is about, and we have a tendency 
to sooner or later ask what the whole point of life is, then we must sooner or later ask what the 
religion we follow is about and not merely enjoy it as mere ritual or revel in its mystery. If that is 
true, yet we live our religious lives according to the Mystery approach, we will be lost. The point 
here is, again, that the Truth approach makes us immune to the despair brought about by difficult 
questions because the conceptualisation of the Truth approach makes the existential subjects 
found in religion – and which are inevitable in life – easily recognisable as something which we 
will or already have experienced in life, making it possible for us to find satisfying answers in the 
religion of which we are a part. In the same sense that truth connects us to art, it also connects us 
to religion. The Truth approach may not have answers, but it allows us to navigate once we are 
inevitably put in a situation where we need them. 
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6.3.4 “Possibility” described in art as part of existential truth 
 
While we do – as is assumed in content-based interpretations of art – demand truth as a criterion 
for gaining existential meaning (as when themes in art provide a concept that is existentially true 
to us), an artwork‟s content may not only contain a true concept, but also a true “quasi-
experience” of what it is to be human. For example, reading fiction is a way of reflecting upon 
our lives and the problems therein by providing concrete scenarios of descriptions of life as well 
as by relating generally to our own experiences of life‟s more extreme situations.103 Literature has 
the ability to help us live by creating a lively, usually detailed description of what could happen in 
our lives depending on which paths we choose. Hence fiction in this case is not tried, empirical 
knowledge, but knowledge about a possibility.104 
 Again, the distinction between plot/story and subject/theme applies. A novel is 
not only an exploration of a subject, but a shortcut to an actual life experience by way of its plot. 
In this sense, Fyodor Dostoyevsky‟s Crime and Punishment recounts what might happen – in terms 
of anguish, mainly – to a person of nihilistic tendencies who murders a fellow human being in 
order to test a philosophical hypothesis. Dostoyevsky, in a manner of speaking, renders humanity 
a service by letting us know what might happen to certain people under certain conditions (even 
if this is not Dostoyevsky‟s main goal in writing his book), preparing us all for such a possibility 
of events. Fiction puts us in a setting where we are “forced” to encounter a certain experience. In 
other words, while a theme in a work of art functions to pinpoint (or “formulate”) the 
inevitabilities of life (e.g. what love is), the role of a plot is to recount the possibilities of these 
inevitabilities (e.g. what love might lead to). While an artfully explored subject (in this case love) 
may make us exclaim, “Yes, that is truly what love is!”, the corresponding plot may rather make 
us ask, “Oh, so that is what love can do to me?” 
 The question, however, is how existentially meaningful a described possibility is. Is 
there not a substantial risk that if we evaluate art by its plot being an accurate description of 
certain consequences, then we are left with a mere strategy guide to life? A strategy guide may be 
practical, but not necessarily existentially meaningful. The existential satisfaction in having read a 
novel which in a remarkable way pinpoints love or fear or joy or death, appears much more 
valuable than the existential satisfaction gained from having read a novel which merely describes 
the cause and effect related to a subject. Instinctively one may protest that this argument is 
counterintuitive, at least in an empirical sense, because the experience of reading about the Prince 
                                                 
103 C. R. Bråkenhielm, Verklighetsbilder, Nora, Nya Doxa, 2009, pp. 222-4. 
104 Ibid, pp. 226f. 
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of Denmark and the consequences of his endeavours does seem meaningful. This 
counterargument could in turn be countered by claiming that the perceived meaningfulness of 
the reading about the possibilities lying dormant in any inevitability of life is in reality derived 
from how the possibilities in the shape of plot is used as an expression of the theme, and that the 
plot or the real-life possibilities it explores are in themselves anything but existentially meaningful. 
But even if the examination of possibilities appears meaningless because it is merely 
practical or merely instrumental in the expression of a theme, it seems that knowing the 
consequences of the inevitabilities of life is existentially meaningful if we consider the ontological 
implications. Namely, the examination of the cause and effect of the inevitabilities of life 
illustrates the limits and borders of any of those inevitabilities. This, I would assert, is relevant to 
the Truth approach: creating a limited ontology by defining its reality (i.e. creating limits and 
borders) is exactly what finding truth is about. If the effects of love are demonstrated – even if 
the scenario in a novel is merely a possibility – our emotional landscape becomes clearer, more 
easily defined and more easily manoeuvrable. “Possibility analysis” is thus the kind of “if-then” 
statement that, I believe, creates existential safety in the lives of human beings and brings us 
closer to existential truth concerning life‟s inevitabilities because what the consideration of 
possibilities says about e.g. love is, “This is what will probably happen to you emotionally when 
navigating on the proverbial Seas of Love”. In other words, it helps us navigate our emotional 
landscapes. Analysis of plot to illuminate the possibilities of the inevitabilities of life is therefore 
important in defining the truth of an artwork in a more detailed manner and is therefore an 
analysis which assists us in receiving existential meaning from the same. 
 To relate this to the objectivity and relevance of the Truth approach, it is 
reasonable to believe that the finest art in this case of plot is the one that most thoroughly and 
beautifully recounts and identifies experiences which are universal in the sense that they are 
inevitable to most human beings, again referring to the “existential inevitabilities”. It might seem 
contradictory to, on the one hand, demand universality from these artworks when, on the other 
hand, the point of “possibility” is to provide shortcuts to experiences we have not yet 
encountered – how do we know what an existentially satisfying artwork is if we have not 
encountered the experiences of which it speaks? This was the point of evaluating the success of 
the rendition of themes in art: the reviewer of an artwork has the ability to properly evaluate an 
artwork because a reviewer must (reasonably) have gathered enough experience of life (and 
therefore the generalised human soul) to know which subject a work of art explores, even if he or 
she has not experienced the events brought about by the story rendered in the artwork. And 
indeed, even the most experienced reviewers, who know the human soul inside and out, have 
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never experienced life in the courts of medieval Denmark as recounted in Hamlet, but may 
nevertheless recognise its subjects and how accurately they express it. 
 In religion, plot in the role of illuminating possibilities of the inevitabilities of life 
corresponds to some degree with the function of initiation rituals. Among some indigenous 
peoples to this day, certain initiation rituals are a way for the individual to rapidly gain experience 
of adult life. While marriage is a ritual which existentially divides life into a “before” and an 
“after”, an initiation ritual is a procedure which moreover provides a glimpse of what e.g. a young 
man is to expect of adult life. In the same way as novels prepare us for events of a life we 
possibly cannot have the chance to experience first-hand, but have all to gain from knowing 
beforehand, religious rituals prepares the initiate for what might happen in life. 
 
6.3.5 The Truth approach not altogether anti-mystery 
 
Despite concepts being “anti-mystery” in the sense that a concept makes us reflect and to force 
us out of an immediate experience of art, the Truth approach does not entirely lack mystery 
insofar as our concept of choice may describe a work of art as mysterious. An artwork which 
depicts mysterious events or creates a mysterious atmosphere may still be contained within the 
concept. Conceptualisations do not, therefore, avoid mystery as such, but may let mystery and its 
ambiguity be part of the aboutness. 
A superficial manner in which a mysterious mood may be constructed is by the 
artist‟s reliance on plot. An example would be detective fiction, where the narratives centre on 
the gradual uncovering of an unidentified cause of typically horrid effects. The mystery lies in the 
circumstance that the culprit is unknown from the outset and we as readers are usually taken 
along on a journey sided by shady characters and strange events. Shadiness and strangeness are in 
turn attributes of the worlds created by writers of horror fiction, whose characteristics we usually 
associate with the mysterious: ghosts, darkness, death, evil, the afterlife, assorted monsters and so 
forth. The mystery is not necessarily brought about by the reading of these characteristics as 
metaphoric, but rather by how these characteristics in themselves are considered mysterious (usually 
through tradition or inherent in all human beings biologically [as shown by how our sensitivity to 
detecting agents easily creates “ghosts”105]). Nor is there – more importantly – a need for a 
Mystery approach to produce this sense of mystery. A classic horror novel like Bram Stoker‟s 
Dracula is practically overflowing with the token manifestations of what is commonly referred to 
as mysterious, but the whole story can nevertheless, according to the Truth approach, easily be 
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summed up in rather dry concepts pertaining to the blood symbolism which Stoker sought, the 
Victorian nightmare of Dracula as the emblem of immorality which tempts and corrupts the 
nation, an inner parasitic enemy who only needs the slightest invitation in order to suck the blood 
and sense out of English aristocracy. And so on. 
To a more profound degree, however, the aboutness of an artwork may induce a 
sense of mystery not only on the level of plot, but on the thematic level as well by the means of 
metaphor. For example, a mysterious aura is brought about by the writing of Joseph Conrad‟s 
Heart of Darkness. While we can imagine that the author in question had a carefully reasoned 
theme in mind when writing this novel and went about the job in a more or less deliberate 
fashion, Conrad handles the subject in a way that creates a world that rather adequately can be 
labelled as mysterious: a metaphor runs deep throughout the novel, and it is through reading of 
metaphor that a sense of mystery – even in the pursuit of truth – is felt. Even though truth 
demands for us to find out what an artwork is about, the two-sidedness of metaphor provides a 
particular semi-mysteriousness to any work of art; the message is hidden, but it is our quest as 
readers to take the “scientific” journey towards the truth behind the symbols set up by the 
author. 
Conrad‟s novel can be interpreted as the guilt of European colonialism, but we can 
also make a more general interpretation of playing God and thus go deeper. If we read Heart of 
Darkness as a battle of the soul in modern times, Conrad makes the dark waterways to the depths 
of Africa an obscure, fateful and eschatological route to humanity‟s most primordial intentions, 
where the idea of civilisation – of us as humane, noble and elevated beings – is relentlessly 
challenged. On the trip on the rivers of Africa, horrifying cries of the natives are heard among the 
trees. These, however, are not aggressive battle cries, but mournful, distraught screams of all of 
mankind: our soul cries out in the darkness. The way down the river is the path towards self-
knowledge, risking our mental stability as we go. When alone in existential darkness, all we can do 
is to shout like the enigmatic antagonist of the story, ivory trader Kurtz: “The horror! The 
horror!”106 This description of Heart of Darkness is all conceptual, it is all “aboutness”, and yet it 
describes a mysterious aura brought about by Conrad‟s powerful metaphor. 
Also, ambiguity may, seen from the artist‟s perspective, be the whole point of an 
artwork. Kurtz‟ famous line above, for example, is purposefully open-ended; “the horror” may 
refer to practically any demons of our minds. But open-endedness in itself does not necessarily 
mean that readers should call it quits when it comes to finding truth in art, give up any 
conceptualisation of the novel and instead accept the Mystery approach as a superior method to 
                                                 
106 J. Conrad, Heart of Darkness: And Other Tales (C. Watts Ed.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 178. 
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reading Heart of Darkness. If we conceptualise the novel with regard to its ambiguity, the concept 
is not ambiguous in itself because we know what we are talking about (i.e. what we refer to) when 
we discuss ambiguity as concept. Thus ambiguity may be contained within the concept we choose 
to represent an artwork and we may say that artwork x is, in part, about ambiguity. 
The Truth approach is not the same as Kant‟s term ontotheology which “believes 
that it cognizes the existence of the original being through mere concepts, without the aid of the 
least experience”.107 The Truth approach does not avoid experience nor does it rely on 
conceptions alone. The Mystery approach, however, has more in common with Kant‟s term 
cosmotheology in so far as it is described as inferring “the existence of the original being from an 
experience as such (without determining more closely anything concerning the world to which 
this experience belongs)”.108 The Mystery approach, namely, seems wholly unable to “contain” 
any truth (like truth is able to contain some mystery, even though the latter has then been 
conceptualised). Even if the magic is not unescapably broken as soon we start to reflect upon what 
the meaning is to be gazing upon a smiling toddler, it strongly interferes with the experience and 
must be ignored. In this case, one might discuss evolutionary reasons as to why we enjoy looking 
at happy toddlers, and such explanations put an academic, cynical or even brutal veil upon the 
whole experience: while gazing upon such a face we do not want to know e.g. that we are selfish 
creatures who enjoy this because it is and has been evolutionarily advantageous to us. Less 
utilitarian explanations like those provided by the Truth approach, however, with its concern for 
existential meaning as opposed to any scientific explanations, may be a lot less interfering with the 
genuineness of the experience. As with art, we receive meaning from a toddler‟s face via the 
Truth approach by interpreting what the toddler wants to communicate with its smiles. We could 
explain the toddler‟s happy face‟s “theme” as being about love: it makes sense to interpret it as an 
“I love you” message and is satisfying and meaningful to us not because the truth of it relates to 
the toddler‟s intentions (in parallel to the intentions of an artist that we sometimes wish to 
uncover in order to find the true meaning of an artwork) and not even because the toddler‟s 
smile makes us feel loved, but because the smile pinpoints and relates to a feeling about love. 
From a Truth approach point of view, the concept of love as channelled to us through the 
toddler is meaningful to us primarily because it makes us proclaim that, “This is what love is”, 
not declare that “I am loved”. And this distinction is, I think, the reason why mystery cannot 
contain truth: even when we, in this case, perhaps only want to be loved and feel love, truth 
provides us with a “dry fact” of sorts, a “mere” statement about things dear to us. The Truth 
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approach can contain the ambiguity of mystery if ambiguity is turned into something conceptual, 
but the Mystery approach has no way of containing a statement in its realm of emotions without 
to some degree leaving that realm. This would not be much of a disaster should we be able to 
return to the pure original experience once we have gained knowledge through conceptualisation. 
But this may seem impossible: innocence once lost is hard to regain. The immediacy of mystery is 
forever “contaminated” by truth because it puts a bridge of reflection and historicity between us 
and the sense of infinity otherwise provided by the Mystery approach. Seeking mystery, we worry 
that we cannot help but think in matter-of-factly statements once something has been explained 
conceptually. Experience inevitably forces us to view the world with a new set of eyes. 
The same goes for art: we cannot say that H. P. Lovecraft‟s short story The Other 
Gods is about “epistemological limitations as a gift from the Gods” without tainting the pure state 
of the story‟s unconceptualised world. Once we have already conceptualised the work, it is 
suddenly difficult to find meaning in the instinctually strong feeling brought about by losing 
ourselves in the tale where a naïve man finds something even more primordial than the gods he 
and the people in his village have always venerated, without being forced to take the detour of 
what the meeting with those forces means in conceptualised form. 
The Mystery approach antagonism towards truth (where no truth aspect 
whatsoever is recognised) appears prominent in religion as well. While the approach of scientists 
like Richard Dawkins, who, while intent on finding truth above all, is tolerant of mysterious 
experiences,109 it seems unlikely that someone who defends religion by use of arguments that say 
that seeking for the “truth” behind the mystery of God ruins faith (in its pure form) should 
tolerate even minor intellectual reflections to invade upon the experience of mystery. Because by 
doing so, we take God down to earth to make His divinity serve our earthly existential needs; we 
demand some objective agent to tell us that love is like this, death is like that or that shame is 
indeed like so and so. But to relate God to human beings and our feelings, God does no longer 
seem as important. Indeed, even if God now takes on the character of an understanding and 
authoritative agent, He does not have the authority of a being whose power the Mystery 
approach depicts as so great that it is virtually impossible for human beings to try to fathom it. 
Thus, the Mystery approach shows a certain “fragility”, unlike the Truth approach. 
 
7. The advantage of critics 
Thus far, we have brought some clarity as to why the Mystery approach standpoint is concerned 
with keeping Truth queries at bay: the Mystery approach always has immediate sensuous access 
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upheld by a shroud of mystery, while the Truth approach only may provide existential truth. 
Immediacy is lost once we take on the Truth venture and we may stumble upon existential falsity 
as well, so why risk it? The answer lies in what exactly this loss of immediacy entails. 
The Truth approach seems to be not only possible, but reliable. Art and religion are 
tested for truth against the generalised human soul, which is possible to refer to objectively 
because the generalised human soul on the one hand and art and religion on the other hand fulfil 
objectivist demands of conceptualisation and possibility to imagine sufficient epistemic access. 
Because any conceptual interpretation of e.g. an artwork is more or less accurate (“fits” more or less 
accurately), because an entirely arbitrary interpretation would be absurd, an interpretation can 
also be more or less true, which further supports the notion that objectivity is possible not only a 
priori, but also a posteriori. 
 But even if accuracy is possible via the Truth approach, that accuracy not only 
identifies a true religious or aesthetic expression as true, but also a false religious or aesthetic 
expression as false. So, while there seems to be no methodical hindrances, the truth or falsity of 
an artwork ultimately depends on the individual artwork itself. Thus the risk of diminished 
existential meaning is still present. 
This, however, seems to me to be a substantial problem only if we assume that we 
are lone agents facing a multitude of unknown aesthetic or religious expressions. This is not the 
case if we consider the societal factors which help us find existential truth. For art, we have a 
community of critics who gives us ideas about how to look at an artwork, tries to communicate 
what the critic teaching himself or herself what he or she is looking at,110 and tries to express the 
complicated effects that an artwork has on us.111 In art critic and professor of art education Terry 
Barrett‟s view, critics  
 
work for viewers of art and those members of society who want to think critically 
about the times and conditions in which we live. […] When critics do their work 
well, they increase for their readers understanding and appreciation of the art they 
write about.112  
 
And in the Truth approach perspective, understanding allows us to extract meaning from art. 
Interpretation, says Barrett, is “ultimately a communal endeavor and the community is eventually 
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self-corrective”,113 which suggests that even a canon of sorts – which could support our search 
for existential truth in art – is not impossible. 
So, the Truth approach may trust in experience in the sense that the experience of 
the community of which we are a part constitutes an important aspect in our choice of which 
artworks on which we should spend our time. The collective experience helps us navigate the 
mass of artworks much in the same manner that the Truth approach itself helps us navigate an 
individual artwork. This means that our choice of artworks becomes neither random or devoid of 
context, nor a struggle with a multitude of artworks that may or may not be meaningful. 
Therefore, the risk of stumbling upon the disappointment of existential falsity is reduced: it is no 
longer the neutral average of the equation +1-1=0 found in Chapter 6.2.2, but an average which 
is a lot more likely to be positive as long as we put our trust in a more experienced cultural 
community. Immediacy – the trump card of the Mystery approach – is then put up against the 
guiding hand of collective experience. And the reason why mystery-seekers cannot count critics 
among its allies is that any analysis of an artwork, any guiding hand in the understanding of an 
artwork, is anathema to the Mystery “credo”. Even the more cautious attempts at analysis, as 
exemplified by Hoffmann‟s review in Chapter 6.3.3, are likely to shift one‟s focus from mystery 
to truth. 
The religious implication of this discussion is the same. A religious person will 
probably not “choose” a religion the way any person would choose which book to read next, 
which painting to view next or which musical piece to listen to next, but perhaps rather an aspect 
of life (e.g. love) as viewed through a certain religion‟s perspective, hence the principle still applies: 
much as the art community has its fair share of critics, the religious community of which we are a 
part function as the collective mediator between human beings and the divine realm, as in the 
catechesis of Christianity, where the catechists themselves may constitute clergy or family, but 
also the community at large.114 Again, we are not lone agents forced to choose between the safety 
of immediacy and the highly hazardous venture of possible existential disappointment. The 
religious community has knowledge and experience which helps us locate and extract the 
meaning of a religion for our own personal fulfilment. In e.g. Roman Catholicism the aim of 
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catechesis is to “[initiate] the hearers into the fullness of Christian life”115 and each portion of 
Martin Luther‟s Small Catechism is followed by a section of what e.g. the Lord‟s Prayer means.116 
 
8. To have the cake and eat it too: The immediacy of the Truth 
approach 
 
It would perhaps be more meaningful to not know what we are doing or why we are doing it 
when we gaze e.g. upon the happy face of a toddler. The absolute bliss found in such experiences 
does not need explanations to be enjoyed; we forget ourselves and we forget to ask difficult 
existential questions – we are simply “in the moment”. But while religion and art sometimes 
provide these states of bliss, I believe they are not as wholes the equivalents to gazing upon a 
toddler‟s face. Instead, they are intricate expressions with more to communicate than merely to 
provide a haven in which to lose ourselves. They are a sort of blueprints for life. Therefore, I 
suggest that it is possible for us to “lose ourselves” (i.e. experience something profound) without 
losing our grip on this world of causality, relations, space and time, and that it is possible for us 
to lose ourselves knowingly: once we have conceptualised an artwork or a religion, we know what 
we are losing ourselves to, and I believe that willingly doing so amplifies the experience rather 
than diminish it. 
Because what indicates that we cannot fully analyse religion or art by its “contents” 
and still come back to it and “live” it wholeheartedly? Immediacy may be lost by means of Truth 
approach exploration, but may as well be found anew in a new context. The point is to make the 
interpretation come full circle, reminiscent of T. S. Eliot‟s poem: “We shall not cease from 
exploration and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we began and to know the 
place for the first time.”117 
It is of little wonder if the Truth approach is off-putting if we seek mystery. While 
it is easy to enjoy yourself while in the “flow” of e.g. a musical piece – simply letting yourself go to 
the sheer sensuous immediacy of the work – an analysis of it (i.e. to place yourself outside of the 
experience) can, while perhaps enjoyable in its own right (e.g. because it is satisfying to solve an 
aesthetic mystery), be likened to being forced out of the warmth of a sauna. From a simplistic 
Truth approach perspective it can be likened to solving a math problem, hence there is no point 
                                                 
115 Catholic Church, Apostolic Exhortation: Catechesi Tradendae of Pope John Paul II On Catechesis in Our Time, 
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in sitting “in the sauna” staring extra closely at the numbers. But, as I have indicated, there is 
more to the Truth approach than “analysing and moving on”, hence art and religion are more 
than saunas and math problems. Once we have found existential truth in an artwork or in 
religion, we do not merely state the fact and move on to analyse something else. Rather, we revel 
in the perspective this truth analysis has provided, allowing us to enjoy a “post-analytical” 
sensuous immediacy. Once we have read a e.g. novel and found what it is all about or have been 
given explanations by a critic or teacher – thus  having found out how it connects to our human 
souls – we may read it anew, but with the perspective of the artist. Once we have fully 
understood how the religion we practice connects to our psyche and needs, we may fully enjoy it 
as something sensuous and immediate. A certain symbol or act becomes neither an immediate 
but random experience, nor a “dry fact”, but an immediate connection to a certain part of our 
soul. When we read a certain metaphor in a novel and we know what it signifies, it strikes us not 
only immediately because we understand it and therefore do not have to spend time to consider it 
or use our intellectual faculties to comprehend it, but also deeply because we know how it 
connects to our own experiences in life.  
Plate‟s criticism (in Chapter 6.1) of truth as symbol is reasonable in the sense that a 
symbol is difficult to connect to our own psyches if the symbol is, as he states, a culturally stable 
– inflexible – unity of form and content. The logical solution indeed may seem to be to open the 
symbol to our hearts, to turn the symbol inside out. The problem as I see it is that the Mystery 
approach does only that: it keeps the symbol open, but it does not relate it to our souls. The Truth 
approach, on the other hand, appears able to open the symbol up, meld its truth with our 
experiences and close it shut again, so that it indeed becomes a shortcut to a world of immediate 
experience. That way, we recreate the Blakean “Vision, Imagination and Inspiration” while 
nonetheless having our Memory (in the Blakean capital letter sense) locate specific emotions by 
means of conceptualisation. 
Even if the Mystery approach is a wild journey (in accordance with the idea that it 
is a learning experience and Plate‟s focus on passage), and the Truth approach is more about 
aligning the thematic content of art and religion with that of our psyche, it nevertheless seems 
that the latter approach is not about the goal itself (i.e. a fixed existential answer to be removed 
from the experience), but a “guided tour”, i.e. also a journey of sorts, but more informed. 
Also, if the inevitabilities of life as described by Herrmann are inevitable, the 
Mystery approach may be psychologically hazardous in the long run. Because tempting though it 
may be, “ignorantly” losing ourselves in objects (perhaps in an attempt to avoid existential 
suffering) ultimately makes us avoid dealing with the emotional luggage we carry around with us, 
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thus hinders us from truly reacting to our inevitable confrontations with love, death, rage, joy and 
so forth. For example, we cannot simply “objectify” the death of a family member and assume 
our emotional life will find equilibrium. Therefore, we should confront these emotions and do so 
with knowledge of how the souls of human beings function. This is why it is important to 
understand the idea of an artwork or the idea which religious life reveres. 
 
9. A short analysis of works of David Lynch as practical example 
 
David Lynch has been mentioned and quoted earlier, and his cinematic works turn out to be 
highly helpful in illustrating the power of the Truth approach. Indeed, one of the reasons for my 
own conviction that conceptualisation is needed in order to derive the most meaning from an 
artwork comes from a viewing of the films of Lynch. It may be argued that a viewing that is 
extremely focused on the “aboutness” of an artwork makes the work in question no more artistic 
or existentially meaningful than the typical academic paper. But my viewing of the art of Lynch 
says otherwise: it is precisely because of the understanding of their conceptual, “dry” ideas that 
his works become a revelation. 
 My initial encounter with the world of Lynch was disastrous when it comes to 
understanding: I could not make much sense of films like Blue Velvet (1986), Lost Highway (1997) 
or Mulholland Drive (2001). They were enjoyable, but on a whole the films seemed to be too 
fragmentary and too inconsistent to be “about” anything. Indeed, some reviewers, like the late 
Pulitzer-prize winning writer Roger Ebert, assumed that Lynch‟s films were never about anything 
at all: Mulholland Drive was “refusing to yield to interpretation”,118 and Ebert concluded that, “If 
you require logic, see something else”.119 It is true that the art of Lynch is difficult to interpret and 
to conceptualise. Lynch typically depicts the dreams of his main characters, dreams which play in 
parallel with these characters‟ daily lives in such a way that it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to 
tell what is dream and what is reality, rendering a surreal world of experience. But the impression 
that the films are ultimately pointless originates (as we shall see) in how the analysis – not the film 
– is inconsistent or fails to tell a logical story. In the case of Blue Velvet, some reviewers promptly 
state that the film “doesn‟t progress or deepen, it just gets weirder, and to no good end”,120 or 
                                                 
118 R. Ebert, “Mulholland Dr. Movie Review and Summary (2001)”, RogerEbert.com, 2012, retrieved October 9, 2014, 
from http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/great-movie-mulholland-dr-2001 
119 R. Ebert, “Mulholland Drive Movie Review (2001)”, RogerEbert.com, 2001, retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/mulholland-drive-2001 
120 P. Attanasio, “Blue Velvet”, Washington Post, 1986, retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/movies/videos/bluevelvetrattanasio_a0ad54.htm 
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deem it “weird for weird‟s sake”.121 Regarding Mulholland Drive, Lynch has been accused of 
cheating his audience with the single goal of confusing us: “He takes characters we have come to 
care about and obscures their fates in gibberish.”122 The supposed lack of sense in the film makes 
Lynch come off as “arrogant”123 and “fooling around”.124 
It should also be noted that many reviewers, such as Roger Ebert, have written 
favourably of Mulholland Drive. Even when Lynch‟s storytelling is confusing to such a degree that 
the film assumedly is about nothing at all, the fragments that are left sometimes leave the viewer 
with an intriguing set of mysterious questions (that never receive an answer) which make us 
believe we are viewing something highly significant whether we understand it or not (this would 
be a Mystery approach to watching Lynch). This is the same “mess” which other reviewers have 
loathed and which have frustrated viewers who do want answers and assume that formulating the 
main idea of a film should not be as exceedingly difficult as is the case of many of Lynch‟s films. 
 In any case, it turns out that Mulholland Drive and all other Lynch films do contain 
logic. It appears that every detail is meticulously thought out to relate to the larger logic of the 
artwork (although Lynch never works from a theme). The surreal aspects of the film turn into a 
realistic depiction of our emotional life in the sense that we might cry out “Yes, this is exactly 
what [an aspect of life] is like!” in response to it – it rings true to us. 
 In the case of Mulholland Drive, Lynch explores what terrible things jealousy and 
personal failures do to our souls. The film follows a young woman, Diane, who wins a jitterbug 
contest and from there manages to make her way to acting in Hollywood. Another young 
woman, Camilla, gets the part Diane wants, but from pity she helps Diane to receive small parts 
in her films. Diane falls in love with Camilla and the two engage in a relationship. Camilla, 
however, turns out to be a “player” who sleeps with both men and women invariably. 
Predictably, Camilla tires of Diane, abandons their relationship and tells her she is now engaged 
to Adam, the director in whose film they are both acting. In a vengeful state, Diane hires a 
hitman to assassinate her ex-girlfriend, whereupon a couple of detectives try to hunt her down. 
Haunted by constant thoughts on what a failure of an actress, mistress and human being she is, 
the solitary Diane kills herself in her worn down apartment. 
                                                 
121 “Blue Velvet”, Reel Film Reviews, 2001, retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://www.reelfilm.com/mini7.htm#blue 
122 J. Berardinelli, “Mulholland Drive”, Reelviews, retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://www.reelviews.net/php_review_template.php?identifier=1622 
123 R. Reed, “A Festival of Flops”, New York Observer, 2001, retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://observer.com/2001/10/a-festival-of-flops/ 
124 C. Cavagna, “Mulholland Drive (2001)”, AboutFilm.com, 2001, retrieved October 9, 2014, from 
http://www.aboutfilm.com/movies/m/mulhollanddrive.htm 
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 But this is only a summary of what happens in “real life”. The plot deviates 
strongly from the story. Somewhere between the time when Diane gets rejected and the moment 
when she shoots herself to death, she has a wonderful dream whose contents occupy most of the 
duration of this film. In this dream sequence, everything which has gone wrong in Diane‟s life 
since her arrival in Los Angeles is corrected. She arrives as an ideal version of herself in a sunny 
Hollywood where dreams do come true, where everyone is kind and Diane‟s audition amazes 
everyone. In her dream, it is Camilla who is the weak, broken wretch hunted by detectives, while 
Diane is the helpful, optimistic and strong girl who supports Camilla, making the latter fall in love 
with her. Camilla is dependent on Diane, not – as in the real world – the other way around. In 
order to change their biographies in her mind and project her fantasies unto her object of love, 
Diane makes Camilla the victim of a car accident and she now suffers from temporary amnesia. 
To get back at Adam-the-director, Diane envisions him as an aggressive madman who does not 
acquire the contracts he seeks, whose wife cheats on him and whose bank accounts are blocked. 
In order to justify losing her starring role to Camilla, Diane also imagines Adam to be forced by a 
conspiracy to choose her. This defends Diane‟s idealised view of Camilla without letting the latter 
be superior. 
In dreams, we are mostly unaware of the fact that we are dreaming, a circumstance 
which Lynch uses in order to make his film a mystery to be unravelled and the realisation of hard 
reality ever more heartbreaking; neither Diane nor the viewer realise that we are 
experiencing/watching a dream, nor do we understand who Diane and Camilla in the dream truly 
are. Throughout the dream, however, more and more clues are revealed as to what Diane‟s reality 
is like beyond her wishful thinking. Among other things, we uncover premonitory signs of 
Diane‟s death wish, a friend of her aunt doubts Diane‟s identity and a blue key (the sign promised 
by her real-life hitman when the assassination is completed) is found in Camilla‟s purse. Thus the 
dream plays out like a tense battle between on the one hand Diane‟s wishful thinking and on the 
other hand her realisation of who she is and what she has done. 
Lynch‟s labyrinthine method makes us come close to experiencing the hope and 
terrible disappointments of dreams: the fantasies we make up when we wish we were someone 
else and our struggle to keep that fantasy alive, which makes for a commentary on the Hollywood 
film industry. Now, applying this concept to our experience of the film makes each event 
meaningful. A single scene like one where Diane cries and simultaneously masturbates, desperate 
for a flicker of joy, is merely a fragmentary sad scene in a strange world if not supported by a 
concept. Once we know that Diane‟s crying is connected to the overall idea of how her soul is 
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breaking down in front of our eyes because of guilt, lost love and lost dignity, the scene suddenly 
becomes highly significant. 
It seems that the key to understanding most of Lynch‟s films is to assume that the 
main character – usually a morally good person – has something to hide under layers of denial, a 
dark secret that the main character himself or herself usually does not fully comprehend. So for 
example the protagonist in Blue Velvet is displayed as a genuinely “nice guy” who wants only the 
best for his girlfriend, Sandy – he is polite, caring and would never think of her in ways indecent 
– while the film runs like a detective story where he slowly discovers more and more clues to 
uncovering the sexual predator within – his true, socially unacceptable feelings and urges towards 
Sandy. The realisation is a shock which passes into acceptance and absolution via honest 
confrontation with his urges and an overcoming of them. In Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me (1992) 
a young self-hating sophomore is haunted by her repressed memories of childhood molestation, 
anthropomorphised as “Killer Bob” in dreams and visions.  
All films include horrible realisations (and sometimes absolution) which 
communicate an experience which feels almost like our own. But if we do not know what is to be 
realised, the real significance of the artwork is lost. Most of Lynch‟s films would then only be 
creepy detective stories with romantic elements. Thus we need to make an intellectual analysis in 
order to collect the whole potential emotional spectrum of these films. They are possible to enjoy 
as something sensuously immediate only, which seems to be what e.g. Roger Ebert does, but I 
hope to have shown that there is more to be gained from Lynch‟s works via the Truth approach. 
The point here is that the art comes alive from following the concepts that have been presented. 
The indifference that Harry Martinson worried about is nowhere to be found; rather, the 
imagination is most definitely put into motion. This is because concepts provide us with precision. 
While Martinson thought concepts conceal truth, I argue that they guide us towards it. Concepts are 
not the experiences or emotions themselves, but they are the aim which allows emotions to 
pierce our hearts with accuracy. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
In the introduction to this essay I asked whether we should endeavour to try to find truth in 
religion with regards to existential meaning despite there being a possibility that the feeling of 
mystery might diminish meaning in religion. After introducing truth and mystery as approaches 
to religion, the discipline of art was presented as support and comparison with how these 
approaches should be applied to religion. The epistemological and ontological limitations of each 
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approach were discussed: the Mystery approach was found to create ambiguity and retain 
sensuous immediacy in art, while the possibility of objectivity in the Truth approach was 
considered. Further, community was considered as guidance in the individual‟s search of truth, 
and the possibility of immediacy in the Truth approach was discussed. 
The Truth approach does seem to have a few advantages in comparison to the Mystery 
approach. The Truth approach 
 
 confronts and “deals” with the inevitabilities of life, rather than avoids them 
 has the ability to connect our experiences to aesthetic and religious expressions, thus 
achieving emotional accuracy and depth 
 has the ability to recreate the sensuous aspect of mystery within a frame of existential 
knowledge 
 is likely to fulfil its goal – finding existential truth – from support of the community 
 is not as “fragile” as its Mystery approach counterpart 
 
All of these points, I believe, add to the amount of meaning we are able to extract from art and 
religion by means of the Truth approach. The Mystery approach, by contrast, renders all religious 
and aesthetic expressions as something mysterious and sensuously immediate, which, although 
meaningful aspects in themselves, miss out on a lot of the existential potential of these 
expressions. Therefore it is difficult for me, with these results, to argue against the Truth 
approach as an “anti-magical” method which ultimately diminishes existential meaning in our 
appreciation of art and religious life. It seems, rather, that the Truth approach as I have presented 
it is the better choice of the two approaches. 
 Whether this truth-seeking method is preferable in the debate concerning the 
existence of a divine realm is a different question. But as for the question asking whether or not we 
should try to put into words, to conceptualise, our religious experiences, these results imply that, 
indeed, we should. 
By using the method of comparing art and religion and showing how the Truth 
approach extracts existential meaning from both of them, pursuers of material truth may 
hopefully find insight into how truth may – if they accept the Truth approach forays in the 
aesthetic field – also be found in religion, and that the “cold foreign eyes” of the Truth approach 
need not be cold nor foreign, but a friendly hand that opens doors to deeper aesthetic and 
religious experiences and thus a greater chance of experiencing more existential meaning. 
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